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Abstract 
 
The natural gas demand in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is growing 
rapidly, in line with the economic growth in that region. Natural gas has become a vital source of 
energy, especially for power generation, petrochemicals, and industrial applications. A subsea 
gas pipeline network has been installed in the Madura Strait area which is one of the busiest 
shipping lanes in Indonesia. This subsea pipelines are likely to be exposed to the risk of damage 
by ship traffic around the subsea pipeline. The damage of the subsea pipeline may result in 
potential risks to people, environments, and economic loss. Therefore, the safety of the subsea 
pipeline is a critical issue from the viewpoint of economic policies, energy diversification, and 
mitigation of climate change. 
Development of mathematic models in risk analysis is importance to be studied to provide future 
predictions of risk figures. The mathematic models represent the behavior of real phenomena or 
objects in mathematical terms, and they can be applied to predict risk of an object more realistic. 
In this study, the mathematic models are developed based on Fujii’s Model, Banyesian network 
model, and usage of AIS data, to estimate the frequencies of dragged anchor and ship sinking 
over the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. The usage of AIS data is to develop the ship traffic 
modeling around the subsea pipeline. 
In Chapter 1, the background consisting of the reason of this research and location of research 
has been explained in this chapter. 
In Chapter 2, the concept of risk analysis and Automatic Identification System (AIS) have been 
explained. Moreover, the usages of the AIS data on the risk analysis of subsea pipeline are 
described and the result of traffic analysis in the Madura Strait based on AIS data have been also 
presented in this chapter. 
In Chapter 3, the development of dragged anchor frequency model for subsea pipeline in the 
Madura Strait has been performed. The model is proposed to estimate the dragged anchor 
frequency on subsea pipelines based on the concept introduced by Fujii. The proposed model is 
approached by estimating the number of dragged anchor candidates on subsea pipelines, Na, 
based on an analysis of the anchor stopping distance in a critical subsea pipeline area. The 
causation probability, Pc, is estimated using a Bayesian network method that is modified from 
the model of Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and Hanninen. The proposed model is approached based 
on scenario of ships passing through a critical subsea pipeline area and dropping an emergency 
anchor. In this situation, the ship still has a large inertia force and can undergo a deceleration on 
its course as a result of an anchor holding force that is insufficient to hold the ship immediately. 
This condition leads the anchor dragging on the subsea pipeline. The results for the yearly 
 xii 
frequency of dragging an anchor on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait based on the Rule of 
DNV-RP-F107 for merchant ship categories show that the General Cargo (small and medium), 
and Container (small feeder) were found to fall into the rather high frequency ranking of level 4 
(10
-2≥x>10-3) and the Bulk Carrier (Handysize and Handymax), Container (Feeder), Passenger 
(Small and Medium), and Tanker (Small, General Purpose, and Medium Range) were found to 
fall into the medium frequency ranking of level 3 (10
-3≥x>10-4). For the service and navy ship 
categories, the results of the dragged anchor accident frequency per year for Supply Vessel 
(Medium) and the Other Ship (Medium) were determined to fall into the low frequency ranking 
of level 2 (10
-4≥x>10-5) and the Navy/Patrol Ship was determined to fall into the so low 
frequency ranking of level 1 (≤10-5). A mitigation plan could be developed in the future based on 
the results of the analysis using the proposed model. This mitigation could be performed by 
reducing the value of Na or Pc where the frequency is at a medium and high level. 
In Chapter 4, the development of ship sinking frequency model for subsea pipeline in the 
Madura Strait has been performed. The proposed model to estimate the ship sinking frequency 
on subsea pipelines is approached based on the concept introduced by Fujii. A scenario in which 
a ship sinking accident occurs in the Madura Strait area is considered for ship-ship collision over 
the critical subsea pipeline area. After a ship-ship collision, ships may sink and damage the 
pipeline. AIS data is used to develop the ship traffic modeling around the subsea pipeline. The 
results for the yearly frequency of ship sinking on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait based 
on the Rule of DNV RP-F107 are presented in two crossing pipeline locations, in KP35–KP36 
and KP42–KP46.  For KP35–KP36, the ship sinking frequency for General Cargo (Small), 
General Cargo (Medium), and Container (Small Feeder) classes over the subsea pipeline per year 
is determined to fall into the low-frequency ranking, level 2 (10
-4 
>x>10
-5
). For KP42–KP46, the 
ship sinking frequency for all ship classes over the subsea pipeline per year is determined to fall 
into the low-frequency ranking, level 1 (<10
-5
).  
In Chapter 5, this Chapter presents consequences analysis of gas release from gas subsea 
pipeline on the busy ship traffic in the Madura Strait. Some parameters are considered in this 
analysis such as gas properties, gas released scenario, environment condition, and ship traffic 
distribution. The usage of the AIS data combined with the GIS is useful to analyze the ship 
traffic distribution and density as basis to analyze a potency of ship in dangerous situation when 
the gas released from the subsea pipeline. The scenario of gas release accident in this case is 
modeled based on assumption that the subsea pipeline leak or rupture caused by external object 
impact. Therefore, the release flow rates are assumed by 3 scenarios: low, medium, and high. In 
the worst scenario, the high flow rate, the result of gas release duration is estimated about 1 hour. 
The subject ship that causes the pipeline rupture has possibility to be stricken the gas dispersion.  
The average numbers of the ships passing in the Madura Strait based on the AIS data are about 
3.65 ships per hour. In this situation, the some ships are possible to enter in dangerous situation. 
The flammable region or horizontal hazard range is estimated about 97.5 meters (based on 0.5 
LFL). For safety of the ship traffics in the Madura Strait, it is important to consider the gas 
 xiii 
release consequences analysis to develop the navigation buoys marker and navigation map 
around the subsea pipeline. 
In Chapter 6, this Chapter presents the evaluation of risk ranking on subsea pipeline that is 
adopted based on the recommended practice from DNV-RP-F107.  The potential consequences 
of accidental events to subsea pipelines in the Madura Strait are established with consideration 
the consequences of human safety and economic loss. The risk rankings of subsea pipeline due to 
the dragged anchor accident for the merchant ship categories in the ship group of the A1 
(General Cargo (small and medium), and Container (small feeder)) have been determined fall 
into the Not Acceptable region for human safety consequence (A1-H) and economic 
consequence (A1-E). The risk rankings of subsea pipeline due to the dragged anchor accident for 
the merchant ship categories in the ship group of the A2 (Bulk Carrier (Handysize and 
Handymax), Container (Feeder), Passenger (Small and Medium), and Tanker (Small, General 
Purpose, and Medium Range)) have been determined fall into the ALARP region for human 
safety consequence (A2-H) and economic consequence (A2-E). The risk rankings of subsea 
pipeline due to the dragged anchor accident for the service and navy ship categories  in the ship 
group of the A3 (Supply Vessel (Medium) and the Other Ship (Medium)) and A4 (Navy/Patrol 
Ship) have been determined to fall into the Acceptable region for human safety consequence 
(A3-H), (A4-H) and economic consequence (A3-E),(A4-E). The risk rankings of subsea pipeline 
due to the ship sinking accident for all ship groups (B1-H, B2-H, B3-H, and B1-E, B2-E, B3-E) 
for the merchant and the service and navy ship categories have been determined fall into the 
Acceptable region for human safety consequence and economic consequence. 
In Chapter 7, this Chapter presents mitigation and control that is important element of safety 
management, involving the implementation of actions to reduce risk level or maintain risk at the 
Acceptance level.  The scope of the mitigation measures are established in this section briefly as 
follows: to propose all the possible mitigation measures associated with the subsea pipeline 
installation in the Madura Strait, and to evaluate all alternative of mitigation measures. The some 
mitigation measures of the subsea pipeline on the operation phase in the Madura strait are 
proposed based on mitigation measures hierarchy as following: 1) Elimination Method: 
Relocation of the Subsea Pipeline Route, 2) Engineering Controls, 3) Segregation/separation, and 
4) Improvement of Management. The trade-off analysis of each of the mitigation measures is 
performed in order to evaluate positive and negative effects that are used as consideration to 
make decision by government or port authority or pipeline owner. A cost required for each 
mitigation presented above will be dependent on a significant amount of subsea intervention and 
consequently, installation cost, material, ect. In this study, the cost analysis of mitigation is 
approached using qualitative analysis. 
In Chapter 8, this Chapter presents additional discussions and conclusions regarding how 
results of the research in previous chapter. By considering some discussions and results of 
assessment, the some further researches could be performed in order to improve the risk analysis 
of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. Some discussions regarding this study is presented as 
 xiv 
follows: 1) Evaluation of Ship Traffic Data in the Madura Strait, 2) Development of Causation 
Probability Pc, 3) Evaluation of Ship Databases, 4) Examination of Gas Dispersion Effect on 
Marine Traffic, 5) Examination of Economic Consequence, and 6) Examination of Mitigation 
Selection. Some conclusions regarding to risk analysis of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
have been performed as follows: 1) Critical Issue of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait, 2) 
Development of Mathematic Model in Risk Analysis, 3) Proposed Model of Dragged Anchor 
Frequency on Subsea Pipeline, 4) Proposed Model of Ships Sinking Frequency over Subsea 
Pipeline, 5) Consequence Analysis of Subsea Pipeline Accident, 6) Risk Ranking of Subsea 
Pipeline in the Madura Strait, 7) Mitigation of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait. 
In the finally, the proposed model and results of risk rankings of subsea pipeline in the Madura 
Strait have been presented in the papers of Journals. The risk ranking is determined by 
combining frequency ranking and consequence ranking and then comparing the result against 
acceptance criteria in a risk matrix. In this research, the acceptance criteria use the criteria from 
Rule of Det Norske Veritas (DNV), RP-F107. The mitigation analysis has been presented above 
using qualitative analysis to evaluate all implementation possibility of mitigation measures. The 
qualitative analysis of this study shows that there are several options can be applied to protect the 
subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait.  
 1 
1. nnb 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The natural gas demand in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is growing 
rapidly, in line with the economic growth in that region. Natural gas has become a vital source of 
energy, especially for power generation, petrochemicals, and industrial applications. The 
consumption of natural gas as a primary energy resource by the major ASEAN members was 
around 31% in 2008[1].  
In the last decade, many natural gas sources in ASEAN region exist in offshore areas such as 
the Andaman Sea, Natuna Sea, Java Sea, and Makasar Strait. To provide the infrastructure for 
wider utilization of the natural gas, domestic subsea pipeline networks have been built to 
transport the natural gas from the offshore gas platform to onshore receiving facility. Therefore, 
the domestic subsea pipeline networks in some countries in the ASEAN region are increasing 
rapidly [2]. In the next project, in Indonesia, around 3588 km of new subsea pipelines will be 
constructed to connect the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan [3].  
The Madura Strait is one of the busiest shipping lanes in Indonesia. Sea depth for shipping 
lane in the Madura Strait is around 9.50 to 14 meters. A subsea pipeline network is also located 
in the Madura Strait area. The construction of this pipeline was completed in 2008. The subsea 
pipelines located near busy ship traffic like Madura Strait are likely to be exposed to the risk of 
damage by ship traffic around subsea pipeline. The damage may result in potential risks to 
people, environments, and economic loss. Therefore, the safety of the subsea pipeline is a critical 
issue from the viewpoint of economic policies, energy diversification, and mitigation of climate 
change.  
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1.2 Purpose of the study 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to develop the risk analysis of subsea pipeline using 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data in the Madura Strait. In this manner the thesis 
develops the risk analysis for dragged anchor accident on subsea pipeline and ship sinking 
accident over subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. In this thesis, the model of the dragged 
anchor accident frequency and the ship sinking accident frequency are proposed based on the 
concept introduced by Fujii and the Bayesian network method.  The AIS data and Geographic 
Information System (GIS) data are combined to estimate the lateral probability distribution 
function of the ship traffic around a subsea pipeline area.  
Another aim of this thesis is to introduce risk mitigation method for subsea pipeline safety in 
the Madura Strait. In risk mitigation, all reasonably practicable methods are proposed to 
eliminate or reduce the risk on subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. 
1.3 Area Research and Subsea Pipeline Description 
The location of Madura Strait is between Java Island and Madura Island, as shown in Figure 
1-1. A large number of cargo ships, passenger ships, tanker ships, and service ships pass through 
the fairway in the strait. Furthermore, many ports such as the Tanjung Perak Port, Cement Port, 
Maspion Port, Gresik Port, Smelting Port, and Petrokimia Port have been built in the Madura 
Strait area. 
A subsea pipeline network is also located in the Madura Strait area, see Figure 1-2. The 
construction of this pipeline was completed in 2008. This pipeline transports natural gas from 
gas platforms in the Madura Block to Onshore Processing Facilities (OPF) in the Gresik Region 
on Java Island. The pipeline’s route is along a shipping lane in the Madura Strait area from 
Kilometer Point 35 to OPF (KP35–OPF) as shown in Figure 1-2. The North side of the Madura 
Strait area, close to KP35, is defined as the entry and exit gate of the shipping lane.  The pipeline 
has an outer diameter of 16 inches, and it is used to transport 90–200 million standard cubic feet 
of natural gas per day (MMSCFD). For the safety of the subsea pipeline, the pipeline is buried in 
around 2 m of soft clay under the seabed and navigation buoys and a navigation map have been 
developed[4][5]. 
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Figure 1-1 Location of the Research 
 
Figure 1-2 Layout and Route of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait  
Singapore 
Jakarta 
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2. hggf 
Chapter 2 
Risk Analysis and Automatic Identification System (AIS)  
2.1 Risk Analysis of Subsea Pipeline 
Risk analysis is the process of estimating the potential loss for a hazard or risk event. Risk 
analysis should be based on identified risk events and event scenarios. Risk analysis can be 
viewed to be multidimensional quantities that include the combination of the likelihood and 
consequence of such accidents. The likelihood may be expressed either as a frequency (i.e. the 
rate of events per unit time) or a probability (i.e. the chance of the event occurring in specified 
circumstances). The consequence is the degree of harm caused by the event.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 Process of Risk and Risk Analysis Components 
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Figure 2-1 illustrates a process of a risk is being happened. Two major components that cause 
a risk are source of risk and cause of risk. If these two components are happened simultaneously 
then a risk will be happened [6]. 
 Source of risk can be defined as the thing which has the intrinsic potential to harm or 
assist for risk being happened. In the case the pipeline that close to the industrial port where there 
are huge potential threats due to the heavy marine traffic that can be considered as a source of 
risk.  
Cause of risk (what and why) usually represents a string of direct and underlying causes for 
the presence of the hazard or the risk event being occurred. Wrong design, human intervention, 
and third party activities are examples of causes of risk. Both source and cause of risk will 
contribute to the likelihood or probability of a risk being happened. 
When a risk has happened, then it will have consequence or consequences. A consequence, 
outcome or impact can be varied from damage of an asset, loss of profits, environmental damage, 
up to injured or casualties of personnel. 
2.2 AIS Data for Marine Traffic Survey 
2.2.1 Introduction of AIS  
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandated the use of AIS navigation for 
merchant ships at the SOLAS convention in 2000[7]. Specifically, a regulation in SOLAS 
chapter V requires AIS to be fitted in ships of 300 gross tonnage (GT) and above engaged in 
international voyages, ships of 500 GT and above not engaged in international voyages, and all 
passenger ships irrespective of size. The AIS equipment transmits ship traffic data to other ships 
or land-based AIS receivers. Since 2002 new ships and later all larger sea-going ship (>300 GT) 
and all passenger ships are required Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board.   
The AIS data provides information including the ship's identity, type, ship position (latitude 
and longitude), course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information 
automatically to AIS receiver of shore stations and other ships.  
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The AIS data can be used to survey the ship trajectories and to analyze the ship traffic 
distributions. The data does not fully reflect the existing traffic conditions in certain location 
because AIS equipment is not installed in all ships. However, the AIS data is still reliable and 
helpful to analyze the ship traffic distributions. Besides, the AIS data does not provide full 
information about ships. The data of ship’s principal dimensions are not included in the AIS data. 
Therefore, external resources are required to obtain this data.  
 
Figure 2-2 Representation of AIS operation 
2.2.2 Literature reviews of AIS data application  
Recently, several studies in marine field have used AIS data for marine traffic survey. 
Kobayashi et al.[8] proposed a guideline for ship evacuation in the case of a tsunami attack. They 
used AIS data to analyze the ships traffic in the Osaka Bay, Japan. 
Mou et al.[9] used AIS data to analyze collision avoidance in busy waterways. They use AIS 
data to investigate accurate and actual behavior of collision-involved ships in busy waterway. 
The statistical analysis and AIS data from the port of Rotterdam are used to analysis of collision 
involved ships.  
Jiacai et al. [10] used AIS data to propose a novel visualization model to appraise the marine 
traffic situation. The rate of ship turn, speed and ship encounter are elaborated into index of 
dangerous shipping area. 
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Zaman et al.[11] used AIS data to analyze the maritime safety in the Malacca Straits. They 
proposed a method using AIS data and Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to estimate the 
dangerous score. 
In the risk analysis context, how to estimate an accident frequency is one of the vital 
elements. The usage of the AIS data on the risk analysis of subsea pipeline due to ship 
interference is effective in an attempt to remove the subjectivity to estimate the pipeline accident 
frequency. In this thesis, the AIS data is used to identify potential hazard caused ship 
interference on the pipeline and to estimate a probability of ship traffic distribution around the 
subsea pipeline. 
2.2.3 Usage of AIS data on Risk Analysis of Subsea Pipeline 
In the risk analysis context, how to estimate the probability is one of the vital elements in an 
attempt to remove the subjectivity in the analysis process. A range of alternative techniques to 
estimate probability have been developed in many risk analysis in different cases. No one 
technique is foolproof or applicable to every situation, and each has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Developing of techniques might be driven by the depth of risk analysis process 
being applied to the particular case, or the size and strategic importance of the analysis. 
The usage of the AIS data on the risk analysis of subsea pipeline is effective to be applied on 
the hazard due to external interference. In this matter, the AIS data can be used to identify a 
potential hazard caused ship traffic around the pipeline. Moreover, the AIS data also is capable 
to estimate a probability of ship traffic distribution around the subsea pipeline. The threats due to 
internal corrosion or erosion, incorrect operations, design or material defects, intentional damage 
(sabotage), construction or installation activities and pre-commissioning or commissioning 
activities are not included in this study. 
Figure 2-3 shows a methodology for risk analysis on subsea pipeline using the AIS data 
combined with Geographic Information System (GIS), environmental data, historical accident 
data, standard and regulation, pipeline system definition, and aids to navigation and ship traffic 
management.  
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Figure 2-3 Methodology for Risk Analysis on Subsea Pipeline using the AIS Data 
 
Based on Figure 2-3, the Chapters structure in this research are presented as following: 
 The concept of risk analysis and Automatic Identification System (AIS), and modeling of 
traffic distribution using AIS data are in Chapter 2. 
 Development of dragged anchor frequency model for subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait, 
in Chapter 3. 
 Development of ship sinking frequency model for subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait, in 
Chapter 4. 
 Analysis of consequences of gas release from gas subsea pipeline on the ship traffic in 
the Madura Strait, in Chapter 5. 
 Analysis of risk ranking on subsea pipeline that is adopted based on the recommended 
practice from DNV-RP-F107, in Chapter 6. 
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 Development of mitigation that is important element of safety management, involving the 
implementation of actions to reduce risk level or maintain risk at the acceptance level, in 
Chapter 7. 
 Discussion and conclusion regarding how results of the research in previous Chapter, in 
Chapter 8. 
2.2.4 Modeling of Ship traffic using AIS data  
The AIS data combined with the GIS is capable and effective to develop a ship traffic 
modeling around a subsea pipeline. A large quantity of data and some statistical tools are needed 
to estimate a probability density function of ship traffic near subsea pipeline area. The utilizing 
the AIS data in this model is more realistic than making an assumption based on an engineering 
judgment. Figure 2-4 shows the usage of AIS data for the ship traffic model around a subsea 
pipeline area. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Framework of Ship Traffic Modeling using AIS Data. 
2.3 Results of Ship Data based on AIS Data in the Madura Strait 
The AIS receiver was installed at the Institute Technology of Sepuluh Nopember (ITS), 
Surabaya, Indonesia, in cooperation with Kobe University, Japan. In this study, the ship data in 
the Madura Strait are taken by AIS receiver in 2008- 2011. 
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The existing ship traffic condition is not fully reflected by the AIS data because of the 
limitations in the requirements for AIS application on ships by regulation 19 of SOLAS chapter 
V as explained in section 2.2.1. The number of ships per year in the Madura Strait area as 
obtained from the AIS data and Tanjung Perak Port Authority is presented as shown in Figure 
2-5.  
 
Figure 2-5 Numbers of ship per year passing in the Madura Strait 
 
Figure 2-6 shows a population of different ship types in percentages of all ships per year as 
obtained from the AIS data in the Madura Strait area. The several types of ships such as bulk 
carrier ships, general cargo ships, container ships, passenger ships, tanker ships, tugboats and 
supply ships, and navy/patrol ships pass through the Madura Strait area. The general cargo, 
container, and tanker ship respectively have large number of percentages by 38%, 20%, and 15%.  
 
Figure 2-6 Population of Different Ship Types in Madura Strait 
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Figure 2-7 shows the ship distribution of the average number of different ship types per day 
as obtained from the AIS data in the Madura Strait area. Bulk Carrier (Handysize), General 
Cargo (small and medium), Container (small and feeder), and Tanker (Medium Range) have 
large number per day to pass through in the Madura strait. 
 
Figure 2-7 Ship Distribution of Different Ship Types Per Day 
The average number of ships per year passing through in the Madura Strait area as obtained 
from the AIS data is presented in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Estimated Number of Ships Based on Ship Types in Madura Strait  
Ship category Average Number of ship per year 
Bulk Carrier (Handysize) 1991 
Bulk Carrier (Handymax) 1526 
General Cargo (Small) 5906 
General Cargo (Medium) 6305 
Container (Small Feeder) 4446 
Container (Feeder) 2190 
Passenger (Small) 730 
Passenger (Medium) 1327 
Tanker (Small) 1526 
Tanker (General Purpose) 1659 
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Ship category Average Number of ship per year 
Tanker (Medium Range) 1792 
Supply (Medium) 664 
Navy/Patrol 133 
Other (Medium) 863 
 
The AIS data does not provide full information about ships. The data of ship’s principal 
dimensions are not included in the AIS data. Therefore, external resources are required to obtain 
this data. The data of ship dimension based on ship type and class are presented as shown in 
Table 2-2.  
Table 2-2 Ship Dimension of Ship Type and Class in Madura Strait 
Ship type and class LWL Beam Draft DWT 
 
(m) (m) (m) (ton) 
Bulk Carrier (Handysize) 163 27 8.00 18,370 
Bulk Carrier (Handymax) 
max) 
182 30 10.70 30,511 
General Cargo (Small) 96 17 5.00 4,098 
General Cargo (Medium) 142 22 6.50 10,204 
Container (Small Feeder) 144 23 9.50 13,545 
Container (Feeder) 192 30 11.60 30,682 
Passenger (Small) 62 16 3.50 1,003 
Passenger (Medium) 111 20 6.00 3,835 
Tanker (Small) 93 16 5.50 4,939 
Tanker (General Purpose) 154 25 8.50 19,672 
Tanker (Medium Range) 175 27 9.00 25,589 
Tugboat (Medium) 34 9 3.70 142 
Supply (Medium) 63 11 4.60 722 
Navy/Patrol 88 13 5.20 1,897 
Other (medium) 86 14 5.00 1,647 
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2.4 Modeling Ship Traffic Distribution based on AIS Data in the Madura 
Strait 
The modeling of the lateral probability distributions are approximated by continuous 
distributions based on the ship tracks in selected locations. The selection of the fit distribution 
models are validated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The ship trajectory data, longitude and 
latitude, are gathered from the AIS data in the Madura Strait. 
The lateral probability distribution for arrival and departure from harbor in the Madura strait 
respectively are defined as southbound and northbound lateral traffic distribution, as shown in 
Table 2-3 and Figures 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12.  
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Table 2-3 Lateral Probability Distribution Function for Ship Traffic in Madura Strait 
Zone 
Pipeline location 
(KP–KP) 
Fairway number 
Lateral probability 
 Distribution 
function 
 ( ) ( )zf y   
Parameters 
1 
35 to 36  
(crossing 
pipeline) 
None required None required 
Probability of ship 
 passing pipeline is 1 
2 
36 to 42  
(parallel 
pipeline) 
Fairways 1 
(Southbound) 
(narrow fairway) 
Lognormal 
σ = 1.0560E-5 
μ = 4.7249 
3 
42 to 46 
 (crossing 
pipeline) 
None required None required 
Probability of ship 
 passing pipeline is 1 
4 
46 to 50  
(parallel 
pipeline) 
Fairway 2 
(Northbound) 
transition fairway 
Log- 
Pearson 3 
σ = 66.7750 
𝛽= -2.1300E-6 
𝛾= 4.7245 
5 
50 to 54  
(parallel 
pipeline) 
Fairway 2 
(Northbound) 
Lognormal 
σ = 1.8760E-5 
μ = 4.7244 
6 
54 to 58  
(parallel to 
pipeline) 
Fairway 2 
(Northbound) 
Lognormal 
σ = 2.1560E-5 
μ = 4.7244 
7 
58 to 62  
(parallel 
pipeline) 
Fairway 2 
(Northbound) 
expanded fairway 
Weibull 
α = 41208 
β = 112.6700 
8 
62 to 63  
(parallel 
pipeline) 
None required 
No dragged  
anchor hazard 
Probability of ship 
 passing pipeline is 0 
9 
63 to OPF  
(crossing 
pipeline) 
None required 
 (HDD section) 
No dragged 
 anchor hazard 
Probability of ship 
 passing pipeline is  0 
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Figure 2-8 Probability Distribution Function of Ship Traffic (Southbound) for KP36-KP42  
(Lognormal: σ = 1.0560E-5,μ = 4.7249) 
 
 
Figure 2-9 Probability Distribution Function of Ship Traffic (Northbound) for KP46-KP50  
(Log-Pearson 3: σ = 66.7750, β= -2.1300E-6, γ= 4.7245) 
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Figure 2-10 Probability Distribution Function of Ship Traffic (Northbound) for KP50-KP54 
(Lognormal: σ = 1.8760E-5, μ = 4.7244) 
 
Figure 2-11 Probability Distribution Function of Ship Traffic (Northbound) for KP54-KP58 
(Lognormal: σ = 2.1560E-5, μ = 4.7244) 
 
Figure 2-12 Probability Distribution Function of Ship Traffic (Northbound) for KP58-KP62  
(Weibull: α = 41208, β = 112.6700) 
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3. a 
Chapter 3 
Development of Dragged Anchor Frequency Model 
3.1 Introduction 
The subsea pipelines located near busy port areas have a potency to be exposed to the risk of 
damage by ship activities such as dragged anchors and dropped objects. Such damage may result 
in potential risks to people, environments, and economic loss.  
In this Chapter, the potential risk caused by dragged anchor is adopted based on definition 
from DNV-RP-F107. Emergency anchoring due to drifting ship can create a dragged anchor to 
subsea pipeline[12]. A dredging anchor which holds the ship bow steady when ship is being 
maneuvering does not included in this study. 
A review of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and Pipeline and Riser Loss of 
Containment (PARLOC) publications shows that there were 11 recorded incidents of anchor 
damage for over 25,000 km of subsea pipelines in the North Sea area during 1996–2001[13]. In 
the ASEAN region, in the offshore of Vietnam, there were two dragged anchor accidents on the 
subsea pipeline in 1994 [14]. 
This Chapter develops a model based on analysis of an actual dragged anchor accident in the 
Madura Strait of Indonesia. In this model, some aspects are investigated and used: 
(a) An analysis of the anchor stopping distance after a ship drops an emergency anchor is 
considered in this proposed model. 
(b) AIS data is used to develop the ship traffic modeling around the subsea pipeline. 
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3.2 Modeling 
3.2.1 Literature Review 
Several models have been developed by some researchers to estimate the dragged anchor 
frequency on a subsea pipeline as explained following:  
Braestrup[15] developed a mathematical approach to estimate a dragged anchor probability 
based on number of critical ship movements per year (n), probability anchor drop in critical 
dragging length ( critL ) . In this method, the critical dragging length for dropped anchor is 
determined by assumption of 100 m and the frequency of drops per year ( dropf  ) is estimated 
using statistic method. The equation of this method is presented as following: 
1 1
1852
ship group
drop drop crit
ship
P f nL
V
      (3-1) 
Where n is number of critical ship movements per year, dropf  is frequency of drops per year, shipV  
is speed of ship, and critL   is dragging length for dropped anchor. 
Vitali et al.[16]   estimated dragged anchor frequency is approach based on the ship traffic 
intensity, probability of ship causality ( ,SC iP ), and geometry interaction probability of ship in the 
critical area ( ,m iP ).The equation of this method is presented as following: 
   , ,.
1
1 1
N
in
occ
SC i m ikm yr
i
F P P

 
     
 
    (3-2) 
Where i is the i-th ship class type, n is the ship class type number, ,SC iP  is the probability that the 
ship casuality can cause an interaction with the pipeline, ,m iP  is the probability that a ship is in 
critical area (geometry interaction probability), iN  is the number of ship crossing the pipeline 
per KP and per i-th ship class type.  
EIA method[17] estimated dragged anchor frequency based on some parameters such as 
incident rate (/year/km2), probability of anchor drop, and drag distance. The anchor incident rate 
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was assumed to apply equally to all classes of ship. The equation of this method is presented as 
following: 
2Dragged anchor frequency = incident rate (/year/km ) × probability of  anchor drop 
                                              × drag distance
   (3-3) 
Zhang et al.[18] applied a statistical method to estimate by combining the subsea pipeline 
failure rate (per-km-yr) and length of pipeline. The pipeline failure rate based on the actual 
dragged anchor accidents were recorded in the pipeline and riser loss of containment database 
(PARLOC).  
Stefani et al.[19] estimated the dragged anchor frequency on a subsea pipeline by combining 
the probability of emergency anchoring per unit distance traveled, the number of ship of each 
size and type per year crossing the pipeline route, and mean anchor dragging distance for each 
size and type of ship.  
Pillay et al.[20] estimated the frequency of anchors dragging on the subsea pipeline in the 
Singapore Straits using a statistical method from historical data. This method is approached by 
combining the probability of emergency anchoring and the number of ship which are observed 
within 3 nm. 
3.2.2 Ship accident estimation using Mathematic models 
Recently, the numbers of ship accidents have been estimated using statistical and 
mathematical methods. Statistical methods provide realistic figures, but they are difficult to use 
for future predictions because the situation may differ from today. Mathematic models represent 
the behavior of real phenomena or objects in mathematical terms, and they can be applied to 
predict the frequency of ship collisions in the future[21]. Fujii et al.[22] developed a 
mathematical approach that is commonly used to estimate the numbers of ship accidents. This 
model has been used in many marine accident analyses because of its simplicity and 
robustness[23][21].  
Some researches that have developed some models based on the Fujii model are Pedersen 
[21] developed a model to estimate the ship-ship collisions frequency by establishing a 
mathematic model to estimate the number of ship-ship collision candidate Na. It used some 
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parameters such as static collision diameter Dij, traffic flow Q, ship speed V, traffic distribution f. 
Talavera et al. [24] modified the model of traffic distribution functions in Pedersen’s model by 
using Dempster-Shafer theory. This method is proposed for quantification and propagation the 
uncertainty originated from the variability of trajectories. Montewka et al.[23] modified 
Pedersen’s model. In their model, Dij was replaced with the minimum distance to collision 
(MDTC) estimated using an experimental ship model. In other words, ship maneuverability was 
represented by the MDTC. In further research, Montewka et al. [25] proposed a mathematic 
model to estimate ship-ship collision frequency by using the MDTC value and causation factor 
Pc for three types of meeting: crossing, head-on, and overtaking.  
The Fujii’s model can be represented as follows: 
a cN N P        (3-4) 
where: 
 N : the ship accident frequency per unit time 
Na : the number of ship accident candidates per unit time 
Pc : the causational probability, which is called the probability of failing to avoid an accident.  
The Na reflects the marine geographic condition and intensity of marine traffic. The 
causational probability is currently estimated in two ways: using the scenario approach or the 
synthesis approach [26]. 
3.2.3 Model of Dragged Anchor Frequency on Subsea Pipeline 
In this study, a model to estimate the dragged anchor frequency on a subsea pipeline is 
proposed using Fujii’s model. The proposed model consists of two main parameters, namely, the 
number of the dragged anchor candidates on a subsea pipeline (Na) and a causation probability 
(Pc). Na is developed based on an anchor stopping distance analysis to determine a critical 
pipeline area and the use of the AIS data to analyze the ship traffic distributions around the 
subsea pipeline. Pc is developed using a Bayesian network model. The proposed model for the 
dragged anchor frequency on a subsea pipeline is presented as follows: 
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d a cN N P       (3-5) 
 
In the anchor stopping distance analysis, a ship may drop its anchor in an emergency 
situation to stop the ship’s movement. In this situation, the ship still has an inertia force and can 
undergo a deceleration on its course as a result of an anchor holding force that is insufficient to 
immediately hold the ship. Under this condition, the ship will stop at a specific anchor stopping 
distance. The anchor stopping distance is the total distance required for a ship to completely stop 
after its anchor has been deployed.  
Figure 3-1 shows a ship passing through a critical subsea pipeline area and dropping an 
anchor. This may lead to the anchor dragging on the subsea pipeline. The anchor will stop at 
anchor stopping distance S. The width of the critical subsea pipeline area, D, can be estimated 
from analysis of the anchor stopping distance.  
 
Figure 3-1 Representation of Anchor Stopping Distance and Critical Pipeline Area 
3.2.4 Anchor Stopping Distance Analysis 
The anchor stopping distance analysis is approached using a static analysis method. The 
anchor stopping distance is estimated by the change in the momentum equation. Several 
parameters is used to estimate anchor stopping distance, including the anchor holding force, ship 
resistance force, and ship inertia force. 
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x
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The anchor and chain of the ship are designed to withstand environmental loads on the ship, 
such as the current load, wind load, and wave load. The anchor system is not designed to stop the 
ship under way on, as the momentum exceeds the limit of the anchor holding force. In the case of 
a ship with initial velocity V1, the change in the momentum equation of motion is presented as 
follow: 
 2 1. - . .mV mV F T       (3-6) 
 
where  
 V1 : the initial velocity when the anchor is dropped on the sea floor 
 V2 : the final velocity (0) 
  m : the mass displacement of the ship 
 F  : the total resistance force and the anchor holding force 
 T  : the time required for the ship to stop  
The T is expressed by the following equation: 
 
 1-  
m V
T
F


      
(3-7) 
 
The anchor stopping distance, S, is expressed by the following equation: 
 
  2 10.5S V V T       (3-8) 
Thus, the anchor stopping distance for a ship belonging to class i, specific initial speed 
( )
1 izV V
 , final speed 2 0V  , passing through fairways  and the subsea pipeline zone z, is 
expressed as follows: 
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( ) ( )0.5iz izS V T
         (3-9) 
 
3.2.5 Geometric Probability of Ship in Critical Subsea Pipeline Area  
The geometric probability of ship in critical subsea pipeline area is determined to estimate 
the probability of the ship passing through the critical subsea pipeline area. The equation of the 
geometric probability is approached by the lateral probability distribution, in y axis, multiplied 
by the longitudinal probability distribution, in x axis, of the ship passing through the critical 
subsea pipeline area, see Figure 3-2. The geometric probability is expressed as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )G T L
iz iz iz
P P P         (3-10) 
 
where : 
( )
G
iz
P    : the geometric probability of the ship class i passing through the critical subsea 
pipeline area in fairway   and subsea pipeline zone z 
( )
T
iz
P   : the lateral probability distribution, in y axis, of the ship class i passing through the 
critical subsea pipeline area in fairway  and subsea pipeline zone z 
( )
L
iz
P    : the longitudinal probability distribution, in x axis, of the ship class i passing 
through the critical subsea pipeline area in fairway  and subsea pipeline zone z 
 
Here,  is the fairway identification number, where fairway 1 is the entering fairway and 
fairway 2 is the exiting fairway. 
The lateral probability distribution 
( )
T
iz
P   is calculated using the integral of a lateral 
probability distribution function,
( )
,( )zf y

in the width of a critical subsea pipeline area of ship 
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class i in fairway  and subsea pipeline zone z, ( )izD
 , see Figure 3-2. The equation of the lateral 
probability distribution is expressed as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( )
( )
( )T z
iz
iz
P f y
D
 

       (3-11) 
 
where ( ) ( )zf y
  is a lateral probability distribution function, in y axis, of ship passing through 
subsea pipeline area in fairway  and subsea pipeline zone z. 
The function of ( )zf y

is estimated based on the ship traffic distribution using the AIS data. 
The width of the critical subsea pipeline area of ship class i in fairway  and subsea pipeline 
zone z, 
( )
izD

, can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
( ) ( )
iz izD S Sin
         (3-12) 
 
where 
( )
izS

is the anchor stopping distance of ship class i in fairway  and subsea pipeline zone z. 
Here,  is the identification number of the fairway, where fairway 1 is the entering fairway and 
fairway 2 is the exiting fairway. 
Figure 3-2 shows the ships belonging to class i, initial speed 
( )
izV

, passing through the width 
of the critical subsea pipeline areas in fairways 1, 2  and the subsea pipeline zone z. 
 
 25 
 
Figure 3-2 Ships in Critical Subsea Pipeline Area 
The longitudinal probability distribution 
( )
L
iz
P   is calculated based on the time ( )izt

required for 
a ship belonging to class i to pass a specific subsea pipeline zone z in fairway  divided by the 
total time ( )iT
 for the ship belonging to class i to pass the total length of fairway . The equation 
of the longitudinal probability distribution 
( )
L
iz
P  is expressed as follows: 
 
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
z
iziz
L
iz
i i
L
Vt
P
T T


 
 
 
       
 
(3-13) 
where : 
 
( )
izt

 :  the segment time required for a ship belonging to class i to pass a segment of  
fairway   in subsea pipeline zone z 
 
( )
iT

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fairway  
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Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 illustrate a ship belonging to class i pass a specific subsea pipeline 
zone z, kilometer point 1 to 2 (KP1-KP2). The specific subsea pipeline zone z is determined 
based on the similarity of the geometric characteristic of the pipeline layout in the fairway. 
Figure 3-3 shows ships passing parallel to the subsea pipeline, whereas Figure 3-4 shows ships 
crossing the subsea pipeline. 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Ships Passing A Parallel Subsea Pipeline. 
 
 
Figure 3-4  Ships Passing A Crossing Subsea Pipeline. 
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3.2.6 Model of Dragged Anchor Candidates Na 
In this study, the proposed model of Na is denoted by ( )izNa
 . The equation for ( )izNa
 is 
developed by multiplying the number of ships per unit time, ( )izQ
 , by the geometric probability 
of the ships passing through the critical pipeline area, 
( )
G
iz
P  , as follows: 
 
             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iz iz G iz T L
iz iz iz
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(3-14) 
 
where 
( )
izQ

 is the number of ships per unit time that belong to ship class i in fairway  and pass 
through subsea pipeline zone z. 
Thus, the total number of candidates for anchors dragging of ship class i on the subsea 
pipeline in a specific subsea pipeline zone z is expressed as follows: 
 
 
(1) (2)
iz iz izNa Na Na       (3-15) 
 
 
where :  
 
(1)
izNa  : the number of dragged anchor candidates that belong to ship class i in fairway 1 
and subsea pipeline zone z 
 
(2)
izNa  : the number of dragged anchor candidates that belong to ship class i in fairway 2 
and subsea pipeline zone z 
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3.2.7 Model of Causation Probability Pc 
The causation probability Pc for an emergency dropped anchor by ship is the probability of a 
ship dropping an anchor in an emergency when the ship passes through the critical subsea 
pipeline area. In the general ship accident models, Pc is currently estimated in either of the 
following ways: 1) the scenario approach or 2) the synthetics approach [27]. The Pc that is 
modeled using scenario approach is calculated based on the statistics from the available 
historical accident data. Pedersen [21] argues that the Pc based on scenario approach can be 
calculated from accident data at various locations and transformed to consider the analyzed 
location. The Pc that is modeled using synthetics approach is calculated based on a specific error 
situation analysis for ships. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) [28] and Hänninen et al.[29] applied the 
synthetics approach using a Bayesian network to estimate Pc for ship collision.  
In this study, Pc estimation is done using the synthetics approach with the use of a Bayesian 
network. The Bayesian model network is adapted from a fragment of the model network 
developed by DNV and Hänninen. According to historical data for four cases of anchors 
dragging on the subsea cable in the Madura Strait area of Indonesia, the anchors were dropped 
under emergency conditions when the ships lost control while passing through the critical subsea 
cable area. Various factors contributed to the ships losing control and dropping emergency 
anchors in the Madura Strait, including a bad weather condition, human error, poor pilot 
vigilance, steering failure, and poor visibility. Based on these factors, the network parameters of 
the model by DNV and Hänninen are modified for practical application to an anchor dragging on 
the subsea pipeline in the area of Indonesia. The network structure of the proposed modified 
model is shown in Figure 3-5. 
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Figure 3-5 Bayesian Network Structure of Causation Probability  
for Dropping Emergency Anchor 
 
3.3 Anchor Holding Force and Ship Resistance Force 
The ship thrust after dropping an anchor is reduced by two forces: 1) the anchor holding 
force and 2) ship resistance forces generated by the ship body’s interaction with the 
environmental load. 
The anchor holding force is the sum of the anchor holding force and friction resistance of the 
length of chain in contact with the seabed. The anchor holding force is estimated by Eq. (3.16) 
[30]. 
      hp a cF F F 
       
 
 a a c cf w f L w         (3-16) 
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where :  
 hpF   : the total holding force 
 aF  : the holding force by the anchor 
 cF   : the holding force by the chain 
  af   : the anchor holding factor 
 cf   : the chain holding factor 
  aw   : the anchor weight  
 cw   : the chain weight 
 L  : the length of the chain 
The total resistance force can be calculated by decomposing the static longitudinal force, as 
in Eq.(3.17) [31]. 
 
 T F w pvR R R R        (3-17) 
 
where : 
 TR  : the total resistance 
 FR  : the friction resistance 
 wR  : the wave resistance 
 pvR  : the viscous pressure resistance 
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3.4 Data Analysis  
3.4.1 Applying the proposed model 
The proposed model is applied to estimation the dragged anchor frequency on a subsea 
pipeline. The successful applying the proposed model will require several tasks to be completed 
as shown in Figure 3-6. The Figure show steps required to estimate the dragged anchor frequency 
in proposed model. 
 
Figure 3-6 Proposed method approach 
3.4.2 Subsea Pipeline Description 
An export subsea pipeline transports gas from the Poleng Processing Platform (PPP) to the 
Onshore Processing Facilities (OPF) near the Tanjung Perak Port, Surabaya. The pipeline 
description has been presented in the section 1.2. 
3.4.3 Ship Data from AIS Data 
In this study, the ship data that pass in the Madura Strait are taken from the AIS receiver in 
2008 to 2011. The ship data has been presented in the section 2.3. 
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3.4.4 Anchor Data 
Data of ship anchor weight is needed to calculate the anchor holding force and the anchor 
stopping distance. In this study, the ship anchor weight is approached based on Rule of American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS)[32].  
The result of the ship anchor mass based on ship category passing in the Madura Strait is 
presented as shown in Appendix A. 
3.4.5 Bathymetry Survey and Soils Data  
Understanding the soil mechanical properties is needed to calculation anchor stopping 
distance near the subsea pipelines. Soil mechanical properties depend largely upon the soil 
components and their fractions. There are soft soils components, like boulder, cobble, gravel, and 
sand. The hard soils components consist mainly of silt, clay, and organic matter [33].  
In the subsea pipeline location in the Madura Strait, the soil types consist of very soft soils, 
soft soil, and hard soils. Data of existing condition on seafloor depth, buried depth, and soil types 
on subsea pipeline location are presented as shown in Appendix B.  
3.4.6 Traffic Distribution Modeling Using AIS Data 
The traffic modeling is approximated using a statistical distribution to analyze the probability 
of a ship passing through the critical subsea pipeline area. The lateral probability distribution 
function for ships passing a fairway, 
( ) ( )zf y

, is estimated using the AIS data for each specific 
zone as presented in section 2.4. 
For the cases of crossing the subsea pipeline in zone 1 (KP35–KP36) and zone 3 (KP42–
KP46), the lateral probability distribution function is not required, because all of the ships cross 
the subsea pipeline. This means the value of the probability of ships passing the pipeline is 1.  
In zone 9 (KP64–OPF), there is no threat from a dragged anchor because the subsea pipeline 
was buried 19 m beneath the seabed using the horizontal directional drilling method (HDD). 
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3.5 Result and Discussion 
3.5.1 Width of critical subsea pipeline area in Madura Strait  
The width of the critical subsea pipeline area for ship class i, ( )izD
 , is estimated using 
Eq.(3.12). The angle between the ship’s course and the subsea pipeline axis,  , is assumed to be 
about 15°. The data acquired for the calculation consist of the ship size and type, anchor size and 
weight, initial ship speed (6 knots), soil type (soft clay), average current velocity (0.45 m/s), 
wave condition (calm), and the values of af  (3) and cf  (0.6) [34]. The width results for the 
critical pipeline area based on the ship type are presented in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1 Width of critical pipeline area 
Ship type and class LWL Beam Width of critical pipeline area 
 
(m) (m) (m) 
Bulk Carrier (Handysize) 163 27 81.25 
Bulk Carrier (Handymax) 182 30 86.09 
General Cargo (Small) 96 17 46.38 
General Cargo (Medium) 142 22 74.91 
Container (Small Feeder) 144 23 74.01 
Container (Feeder) 192 30 92.41 
Passenger (Small) 62 16 29.96 
Passenger (Medium) 111 20 55.61 
Tanker (Small) 93 16 45.20 
Tanker (General Purpose) 154 25 79.06 
Tanker (Medium Range) 175 27 82.40 
Supply (Medium) 63 11 29.82 
Navy/Patrol 88 13 37.83 
Other (medium) 86 14 36.78 
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3.5.2 Number of dragged anchor candidates in Madura Strait 
The total number of candidates for an anchor dragging of ship class i on the subsea pipeline 
in specific subsea pipeline zone z,
izNa , is estimated using Eq.(3.15). The parameters considered 
to estimate 
izNa include the number of ships passing the fairway, types and sizes of these ships, 
fairway dimensions, ship speeds in the fairway, and ship traffic distributions in the subsea 
pipeline zone.  
The lateral probability distribution function shown in section 2.4 and the width of the critical 
subsea pipeline area for ship class i, ( )izD
 , shown in Table 3-1 are required to calculate the 
probability of a ship passing through the critical subsea area. The average initial ship speed in the 
fairway is 6 knots and the total duration time for a ship passing the Madura Strait, T, is 3.20 h.  
As an example, estimated probability of ship passing through the critical subsea pipeline area 
by using   and for location of KP50–KP54, KP54–KP58, and KP58–KP62 are presented in Table 
3-2. 
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Table 3-2. Estimated probability of ship passing through the critical pipeline area as an example 
for location of KP50–KP54, KP54–KP58, and KP58–KP62. 
Ship category 
Probability of ship passing through the critical 
pipeline area by based on data from AIS 
KP50-KP54 KP54-KP58 KP58-KP62 
Bulk Carrier (Handysize) 0.077 0.083 0.031 
Bulk Carrier (Handymax) 0.079 0.084 0.033 
General Cargo (Small) 0.055 0.061 0.019 
General Cargo (Medium) 0.072 0.078 0.029 
Container (Small Feeder) 0.081 0.087 0.028 
Container (Feeder) 0.095 0.103 0.035 
Passenger (Small) 0.050 0.057 0.017 
Passenger (Medium) 0.062 0.068 0.023 
Tanker (Small) 0.057 0.064 0.020 
Tanker (General Purpose) 0.075 0.080 0.030 
Tanker (Medium Range) 0.077 0.082 0.032 
Supply (Medium) 0.050 0.057 0.017 
Navy/Patrol 0.053 0.060 0.018 
Other (Medium) 0.052 0.059 0.018 
 
The numbers of dragged anchor candidates for ship class i, izNa , in locations KP50–KP54 
(pipeline parallel to fairway), KP54–KP58 (pipeline parallel to fairway near Maspion Port), and 
KP58–KP62 (pipeline parallel to fairway in expanded fairway) are presented in Figure 3-7. 
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Figure 3-7 Numbers of Dragged Anchor Candidates as an example in KP50–54, KP54–58, and 
KP58–62 
 
 
Figure 3-8 Locations of KP50–54, KP54–58, and KP58–62 in Madura Strait. 
3.5.3 Causation probability in Madura Strait 
In this study, Pc for a dragged anchor accident on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait is 
estimated using a Bayesian network, as shown in Figure 3-5. Based on the Bayesian network 
parameters, some of the probabilities are estimated by an analysis of data from several sources, 
including the Tanjung Perak Port Authority and several external databases related to the case. 
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The weather condition probabilities are calculated from data acquired from the Tanjung 
Perak Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Institute collected during 2003–2012. The 
probability of weather condition is presented in Table C-1 of Appendix C. 
The probability of visual detection or visibility is a conditional probability that is estimated 
based on the probability of the weather conditions. Good weather conditions are equivalent to 
good visibility (>1 nm). Thus, the logical conditional probability of visibility is 1 in good 
weather conditions. Strom/heavy rain conditions are equivalent to poor visibility (<1 nm). Thus, 
the logical conditional probability of visibility is reduced by 25% in Strom/heavy rain conditions 
[28].  The probability of visual detection is presented in Table C-2 of Appendix C. 
The probability of a port pilot guiding a ship is adopted from the National Transportation 
Safety Committee of Indonesia reported in 2012 [35]. The Committee has analyzed port pilot 
onboard to guide ship entering or exiting the Madura Strait. The probability of pilot to guide 
ships in the Madura Strait area is presented in Table C-3 of Appendix C. 
The probability of pilot vigilance is a conditional probability based on the availability of an 
onboard port pilot. An onboard port pilot exercising internal vigilance could help to warn the 
officer on watch (OOW) of dangerous situations[28]. Therefore, the logical conditional 
probability of vigilance is 1 if an on-board port pilot is available and the logical conditional 
probability of vigilance is reduced by 25% if an on-board port pilot is not available. The logical 
conditional probability of vigilance is presented in Table C-4 of Appendix C.  
The probability of human performance is adapted from the result of Harahap et al.’s study of 
human performance for ships officer in the Madura Strait area[36]. The probability of human 
performance for ship-ship collision candidate in the Madura Strait area is presented in Table C-5 
of Appendix C.  
The probability of ship steering failure in the Madura Strait area is estimated based on data 
from the Tanjung Perak Port Authority in 2005-2010. In that period, there were 174,927 ships 
passing in the Madura Strait and 6 of them experienced steering failure system [5].  The 
probability of ship steering failure is presented in Table C-6 of Appendix C. 
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To estimate the conditional probability of a ship dropping its emergency anchor after losing 
control, it is necessary to perform an analysis of all of the ship accidents caused by a loss of 
control. This ship accident analysis is carried out based on the history of ship accidents during 
2005–2011 in the Madura Strait. There were 30 cases (83.3%) of ship collisions, 5 cases (13.9%) 
of ship groundings, and 1 case (2.8%) of an anchor dragging on the subsea cable. Referring to 
this data, the conditional probability of dropping an anchor after losing control is 2.8%.  The 
probability of ship dropping its emergency anchor after losing control is presented in Table C-7 
of Appendix C. 
Thus, the result of estimating the causation probability Pc using Bayesian network model 
and based on data from Table C is 3.60E
-5
 for a ship dropping its emergency anchor after losing 
control in the Madura Strait. 
3.5.4 Dragged anchor frequency on subsea pipeline in Madura Strait 
The dragged anchor frequency on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait, Nd, is estimated 
using Eq.(3.5). The number of dragged anchor candidates, 
izNa , for ship class i in subsea 
pipeline zone z is estimated using Eq.(3.15). The value of causation probability Pc using 
Bayesian network model is 3.60E
-5
. Thus, the results of example for Nd in 2011 based on the 
ship categories are presented in the Figure 3-9 for merchant ship categories and the Figure 3-10 
for service and navy ship categories. 
In the risk analysis context, estimation of the accident frequency is one of the vital elements. 
The important step in risk analysis is determining a risk ranking of each threat that has been 
identified previously. The risk ranking is determined by combining frequency ranking and 
consequence ranking and then comparing the result against acceptance criteria. For subsea 
pipeline, the risk ranking can use the risk matrix from the recommended practice of DNV RP-
F107[12] that consists of: 1) Not acceptable, 2) As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), 
and 3) Acceptable.  In the risk matrix, the frequency ranking consists of five frequency rankings: 
1) So low frequency ranking or level 1 (≤10-5 ). 
2) Low frequency ranking or level 2 (10
-4
 ≥x>10-5). 
3) Medium frequency ranking or level 3 (10
-3≥x>10-4). 
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4) Rather high frequency ranking or level 4 (10
-2
 ≥x>10-3). 
5) High frequency ranking or level 4 (>10
-2
). 
The result of dragged anchor accident frequency for merchant ship categories show that the 
General Cargo (small and medium), and Container (small feeder) have values of more than 10
-3
 
per year. These values are within the rather high frequency ranking of level 4, (10
-2≥x>10-3), see 
Figure 3-9.  
The Bulk Carrier (Handysize and Handymax), Container (Feeder), Passenger (Small and 
Medium), and Tanker (Small, General Purpose, and Medium Range) have values in the 
frequency range 10
-3≥x>10-4 per year. These values are within the medium frequency ranking of 
level 3, see Figure 3-9.  
For the service and navy ship categories, the dragged anchor accident frequency results show 
that the Supply Vessel (Medium) and the Other Ship (Medium) have values in the low frequency 
ranking of level 2 (10
-4≥x>10-5) per year. The Navy/Patrol Ship has values in the so low 
frequency ranking of level 1 (≤10-5) per year, see the Figure 3-10. 
 
 
 
 40 
 
Figure 3-9 Frequency of Dragging Anchor (Nd) on Subsea Pipeline in Madura Strait 
 (Merchant Ship Types) 
 
 
 
Figure 3-10 Frequency of Dragging Anchor (Nd) on Subsea Pipeline in Madura Strait 
(Service and Navy Ship Types). 
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3.6 Validation 
According to the dragged anchor accident records, there were four cases of anchors dragging 
on a subsea cable during 1987–2011. The subsea cable was constructed in the Madura Strait in 
1987. For safety of the cable, navigation buoys have been installed and navigation maps indicate 
that all ships are prohibited from dropping anchor in the cable area. The location of the subsea 
cable is close to KP64 of the subsea pipeline. The subsea gas pipeline is a new structure in the 
Madura Strait. This pipeline was constructed in the Madura Strait in 2008. 
The values of Nd for the subsea cable are estimated using the proposed model. The Pc value 
is 3.60E
-5
 based on the previous analysis. The results of a comparison of Nd and Nd-actual 
during the specified period of years are presented in Table 3-3. However, analysis of model 
validity by comparing with accidents statistic have uncertainty due to the limited number of such 
events. Therefore other models to estimate the dragged anchor frequency can be used as 
comparison with the proposed model. The other models used in this analysis are the Braestrup’s 
model[15] and the EIA’s model[17] and the results of these models are presented as in Table 3-3. 
From the Table 3-3, the estimated value using the proposed model is closer to the value of actual 
accident than the value of the Braestrup’s model and the EIA’s model.   
Table 3-3 Results of estimated value of dragged anchor using the Proposed Model, the 
Braestrup’s model, the EIA’s model, and the Nd-actual  
Years 
Nd 
(Proposed 
model) 
Nd1 
(Braestrup’s  
model) 
Nd2 
(EIA’s 
model) 
Nd-actual 
(Actual 
accidents) 
Ratio 
(
Proposed model
Actual accidents
) 
1987–1994 0.51 0.19 0.09 1 0.51 
1995–2003 0.66 0.24 0.12 2 0.33 
2004–2011 0.58 0.22 0.11 1 0.58 
 
The analyses of ratio values between proposed model with actual accidents are approached 
based on agreements criteria used by Fowler and Sorgård [37]. The criteria consist of three 
categories: 1) good agreement (1>ratio≥0.50) or (1<ratio≤2), 2) reasonable agreement 
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(0.50>ratio≥0.20) or (2<ratio≤5), 3) poor agreement (ratio <0.20) or (ratio>5).  
During 1987-1994 and 2004–2011, the ratio results shows good agreement (ratio value ≥ 
0.50)[37]. During 1995–2003, the ratio result shows reasonable agreement (0.50>ratio≥0.20). 
However, average of the ratio analysis during 1987-2011 is 0.47 (ratio value ≥ 0.20). It can be 
concluded that the ratio of the validation analysis show reasonable agreement. 
3.7 Discussion 
The subsea pipelines located near busy port areas have a potency to be exposed to the risk of 
damage by ship activities such as emergency dragged anchors. Such damage may result in 
potential risks to people, environments, and economic loss. According to the dragged anchor 
accident records, there were 4 cases of anchors dragging on a subsea cable during 1987–2011. 
The accident scenario of an anchor dragging on a subsea pipeline is triggered by some events 
as following: the ship is under emergency condition and loss of control. In this situation, the ship 
has possibility drop an anchor to stop its movement. The ship that still had initial velocity will 
stop at the specific anchor stopping distance.  
This Chapter proposes a model based on analysis of the accident of the dragged anchor on 
subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait of Indonesia. Based on the accident scenario as above, this 
proposed model is developed by considering some aspects as following: the analysis of the 
anchor stopping distance after the ship drops the emergency anchor and usage of the AIS data to 
develop the ship traffic modeling around the subsea pipeline. 
The proposed model uses the mathematical approach that is inspired by Fujii's model. The 
mathematical approach represents the behavior of real phenomena or objects in mathematical 
terms, and they can be applied to predict the frequency of accidents in the future when the 
situation may differ from today. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter presented a new model to estimate the dragged anchor frequency on a subsea 
pipeline in a busy port area. The conclusions made in this Chapter are as follows:  
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1. In this study, a proposed model was developed to estimate the frequency of dragging an 
anchor on a subsea pipeline based on the concept introduced by Fujii and an anchor 
stopping distance analysis near subsea pipeline location. The AIS data were used to 
analyze the ship traffic distribution.  
2. In the proposed model, the number of candidates for dragging an anchor on a subsea 
pipeline, Na, was estimated based on specific characteristics such as the pipeline layouts, 
ship traffic conditions, environment conditions, ship dimensions, anchor types, and 
anchor dimensions. The causation probability Pc was estimated using a Bayesian 
network method that was modified from the model of DnV and Hanninen. Some of the 
factors used to estimate Pc with the Bayesian network were evaluated based on an 
evaluation of the dragged anchor accidents in the Madura Strait area. These factors were 
the human performance factor, navigational factor, weather factor, and support factor. 
The value of Pc for the dragged anchor accidents in the Madura Strait area is estimated 
to be 3.60 x 10
-5
. To use the proposed model in different locations, the same factors in 
the Bayesian network could be modified according to the circumstances at that location. 
3. The lateral probability distribution function, ( )zf y
 , is estimated based on the ship 
traffic distribution in selected area using the AIS data. The width of the critical subsea 
pipeline area is estimated based on the anchor stopping distance analysis that considers 
specific characteristics such as the pipeline layouts, soils characteristic, environment 
conditions, ship dimensions, anchor types, and anchor weight.  
4. A case study to demonstrate the implementation of the proposed model was performed 
for the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait, Indonesia. The results for the yearly 
frequency of dragging an anchor on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait for 
merchant ship categories show that the General Cargo (small and medium), and 
Container (small feeder) were found to fall into the rather high frequency ranking of 
level 4 (10
-2≥x>10-3) and the Bulk Carrier (Handysize and Handymax), Container 
(Feeder), Passenger (Small and Medium), and Tanker (Small, General Purpose, and 
Medium Range) were found to fall into the medium frequency ranking of level 3 (10
-
3≥x>10-4)  based on DNV-RP-F107. For the service and navy ship categories, the results 
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of the dragged anchor accident frequency per year for Supply Vessel (Medium) and the 
Other Ship (Medium) were determined to fall into the low frequency ranking of level 2 
(10
-4≥x>10-5) and the Navy/Patrol Ship was determined to fall into the so low frequency 
ranking of level 1 (≤10-5). A mitigation plan could be developed in the future based on 
the results of the analysis using the proposed model. This mitigation could be performed 
by reducing the value of Na or Pc where the frequency is at a medium or high level.  
5. A validation analysis of the proposed model was performed by comparing the dragged 
anchor frequency estimated using the proposed model with the actual accident record. 
The results of this comparison showed reasonable agreement (ratio value   0.20)[37].  
The other models, Braestrup’s model and EIA’s model are also applied in validation 
analysis. The results of three models: proposed model, Braestrup’s model, and EIA’s 
model show that the proposed model have values are closer the actual historical accident 
than the values from Braestrup’s model, and EIA’s model. This means that the proposed 
models and usage of AIS data and Bayesian network represent the behavior of real 
phenomena or objects in mathematical terms. Therefore, this method can be applied to 
predict the dragged anchor frequency in the future even if the situation may differ from 
today.  This method also can be used to evaluation of mitigation effectiveness to reduce 
risk ranking. Based on this reason, we argue that the usage AIS data is importance in this 
matter. 
6. For the safety of a subsea pipeline, it is important to install navigation buoys as markers 
and indicate on navigation maps that all ships are prohibited from dropping anchor in the 
pipeline area. This proposed model could be utilized to determine an appropriate 
location for putting the navigation buoys and to develop the anchoring navigation map.  
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4. fasd 
Chapter 4 
Development of Ship Sinking Frequency Model 
4.1 Introduction 
The ship sinking over subsea pipeline in Madura strait is one of critical issue because it can 
make rapture of the subsea pipeline. Based on historical data, 6 ships have been sinking after 
collision with other ships in the fairway of the Madura Strait. 
This Chapter proposes a model for estimating the frequency of ships sinking over the subsea 
pipeline in the Madura Strait area. This model is developed based on the concept introduced by 
Fujii and it uses Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for the shipping traffic survey. The 
proposed model deals with the following issues: 
(a) A scenario in which a ship sinking accident occurs in the Madura Strait area is 
considered for ship-ship collision over the critical subsea pipeline area. After a ship-ship 
collision, ships may sink and damage the pipeline. 
(b) AIS data is used to develop the ship traffic modeling around the subsea pipeline. 
4.2 Modeling 
4.2.1 Literature Review 
Several models to estimate ship-ship collisions have been developed by some researchers 
which are presented as following: 
Pedersen [21] developed a model to estimate the ship-ship collisions using several 
parameters such as the traffic flow Q, ship speed V, lateral traffic distribution which is assumed 
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normal distribution f,  static collision diameter Dij as a critical distance in an encounter situation, 
and probability of ship failing to avoid the accident while being on a collision course Pc.  
Talavera et al. [24] modified the model of traffic distribution functions in Pedersen’s model 
by using Dempster-Shafer theory. This method is proposed for quantification and propagation 
the uncertainty originated from the variability of trajectories.   
Montewka et al. [23] modified Pedersen’s model. In their model, Dij was replaced with the 
minimum distance to collision (MDTC) estimated using an experimental ship model. In other 
words, ship maneuverability was represented by MDTC. However, MDTC results are valid only 
for a ship sailing at full speed and provided that the ships have started to take evasive action 
simultaneously [26]. In further developing of the MDTC, Montewka et al. [25] proposed the 
model using the MDTC value and causation factor for three types of meeting: crossing, head-on, 
and overtaking. To determine the MDTC value, the parameters of ship types, courses, 
intersection angles, relative bearing, and speed are considered in the simulation.  
Another approach to estimate the ship-ship collisions was proposed by Goerlandt and Kujala 
[26] using dynamic traffic simulation model. This method uses a micro-simulation in the time 
domain for movement of each individual ship operating in specific area.  
Friis-Hansen et al. [38]
 
proposed the ship-ship collisions model that depends on the segment 
length Lw, geometry probability Pg, traffic flow Q, ship speed V, and causation probability of 
ship-ship collision Pc . In this model, the geometry probability is dependent on the lateral ship 
traffic distribution, which is typically defined by a normal distribution. 
Kristiansen [39] proposed the ship-ship collision model that is approached with mean 
number of meeting ship within a square nautical mile of fairway which is referred to as the 
density of the oncoming ships. The model considers some parameter such as mean beam of ship 
B, ship speeds V, relative sailing distance D, frequency of meeting ships per unit time Nm, and 
probability of ship-ship collision Pc. The model is presented as following: 
1 2 1 2
/ 1 2
1 2
( ) ( )
. . . . .collision year m m c
B B V V
F D N N P
W VV
 
    (4-1) 
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4.2.2 Modeling of Ship Sinking Frequency Due To Collision 
This study proposes a model to estimate the ship sinking frequency over the subsea pipeline 
based on the concept introduced by Fujii. The Fujii’s model has been explained in the section 
3.2.2. The scenario of a ship sinking and damaging the subsea pipeline is considered based on 
ship-ship collision when the ships are moving over the critical subsea pipeline area. After the 
ships collide, extensive damage to their hulls may cause them to sink in the critical subsea 
pipeline area [5]. 
According to this scenario, the proposed model for estimating the ship sinking frequency due 
to ship-ship collision in the critical subsea pipeline area for subject ship belonging to class i in 
zone z , izNs , is expressed as follows: 
 
iz iz fNs Na Pc P                     (4-2) 
 
where  
izNa  
: the number of ship-ship collision candidates for subject ship belonging to class i in 
zone z if ships are on a collision course  
Pc   : the causation probability defined as the probability of failing to avoid a collision 
when on a collision course. 
fP    : the conditional probability of a ship foundering after ship-ship collision. 
4.2.3 Modeling of Ship-Ship Collision over Subsea Pipeline Area  
Based on the historical data gathered by Tanjung Perak Port Authority related with ship-ship 
collisions in the Madura Strait, there are 18 collisions in 1997-2011, 94.4% of the cases are head-
on collisions, and 5.6% are crossing collisions. It can be clearly seen that the main cause of the 
collisions are head-on type. Therefore, in this study, the Na model is developed only for head-on 
ship-ship collisions.  
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In general, the layouts of the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait can be categorized into two 
types: crossing and parallel subsea pipelines. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 respectively show a 
meeting ship encountering a subject ship over crossing and parallel subsea pipelines in a fairway.  
The subject and meeting ship pass through fairway 1 and 2 in a subsea pipeline zone z. The 
fairway 1 and 2 respectively have lateral probability distribution of the ship traffic, (1) ( )zf y and 
(2) ( ).zf y   A length of critical segment for the subsea pipeline area in zone z is .czL  A width of the 
subject ship belonging to class i in fairway 1 is (1) .iB  A width of the meeting ship belonging to 
class j in fairway 2 is 
(2)
.jB  
The collision diameter, 
(1)
iB  + 
(2)
jB , is approached based on the 
concept introduced by Kristiansen [39] and COWI [40].  The differences between the ship course 
of the meeting and the subject ship for a head-on collision are around 180  10°. 
 
Figure 4-1 Ship-Ship Encounter in Critical Crossing Subsea Pipeline Area 
 
Figure 4-2 Ship-Ship Encounter in Critical Parallel Subsea Pipeline Area 
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4.2.4 Number of ship-ship collision candidates  
The number of ship-ship collision candidates Na is defined as the number of ship pairs being 
on a collision course. In other words, ship-ship collision will occur if no corrective action or 
maneuvering is performed.  
In this study, we develop Na model that is inspired by Pedersen’s and Friis-Hansen’s model 
and that follows the concept introduced in Fujii’s model. Friis-Hansen’s model itself is based on 
a concept similar to Pedersen’s model. Both models define the characteristics of ships 
approaching each other and ship-ship collision candidates geometrically. However, in Pedersen’s 
model, the geometrical collision probability is not divided into an independent probability. In 
Friis-Hansen’s model, on the other hand, the geometrical collision probability is divided into an 
independent probability. Therefore, this model is easier to use in practice. 
In Pedersen’s ship-ship collision model, when two ships, i and j, approach a segment of the 
fairway, they have a relative speed ijV  given by the following equation: 
ij i jV V V        (4-3) 
where : 
 i
V   : ship speed  that belong to ship class i 
 j
V   :  ship speed  that belong to ship class j 
The probability of the ships passing over a encounter segment of a subsea pipeline area 
( )
ezP

is calculated by integrating the lateral probability distribution of ship traffic over the subsea 
pipeline area in a specific range of a ship-ship encounter segment, ze  as seen in Figure 4-1  and 
Figure 4-2. The 
(1)
ezP represents the probability of subject ships passing over a encounter segment 
of a subsea pipeline area in fairway 1 in zone z. The 
(2)
ezP  represents the probability of meeting 
ships passing over a encounter segment of a subsea pipeline area in fairway 2 in zone z. They are 
expressed as follows: 
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(1) (1) ( )ez z
z
P f y
e
 
    
 (4-4) 
 
(2) (2) ( )ez z
z
P f y
e
 
    
 (4-5) 
 
where : 
 
(1) ( )zf y   : the lateral probability distribution of the ship traffic over the subsea pipeline area 
for subject ships in fairway 1 in zone z 
  
(2) ( )zf y  
: the lateral probability distribution of the ship traffic over the subsea pipeline area 
for meeting ships in fairway 2 in zone z 
  ze    : represents the width of the ship-ship encounter segment in zone z. 
The probability of a subject ship colliding with a meeting ship in the critical segment of the 
subsea pipeline area in a meeting situation if no evasive action or maneuver is performed is 
expressed as a geometrical collision probability gzP . The gzP is obtained by multiplying the 
probability of a ship being in the critical segment L of the subsea pipeline area lzP  and the 
probability of a ship being in the critical distance side-by-side bzP .  The gzP is expressed as 
follows: 
 
(1) (2)
i jcz
gz lz bz
t z
B BL
P P P
L e
  
     
  
    (4-6) 
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where : 
 cz
L
 
:  the length of critical segment for the subsea pipeline area in zone z 
 t
L
  
:  the length of the all segments
 
 (1)iB  
:  the width of the subject ship belonging to class i in fairway 1 
 
(2)
jB  :  the width of the meeting ship belonging to class j in fairway 2 
 
ze  :  the width of the ship-ship encounter segment in zone z 
The number of subject ships belonging to class i in fairway 1 on a collision course in the 
critical segment of the subsea pipeline area with one meeting ship belonging to class j in fairway 
2 during unit time ∆T is expressed as follows: 
 
(1)
(1)
(1)
( )i ez gz
j
i
Q
V T P P
iV
      (4-7) 
 
where : 
 
(1)
iQ  :  the number of subject ships belonging to class i in fairway 1 per unit time 
 
(1)
iV  
:  the speed of the subject ship belonging to class i in fairway 1 
The number of meeting ships belonging to class j in the critical segment of the subsea 
pipeline area is expressed as follows: 
 
(2)
(2)
(2)
j
cz ez
j
Q
L P
V
      (4-8) 
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where : 
 
(2)
jQ   :  the number of meeting ships belonging to class j in fairway 2 per unit time 
 
(2)
jV   :  the speed of the meeting ship belonging to class j in fairway 2. 
The number of ship-ship collision candidates is obtained by multiplying Eqs.(4.7) and (4.8) 
and summing up the different ship classes in each critical segment and zone. Therefore, the 
number of head-on ship-ship collision candidates in the critical segment of the subsea pipeline 
area for subject ship belonging to class i in zone z, izNa , is expressed as follows: 
 
(1) (2)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (2)
,
i j
iz cz i j ez ez gz
i j
i j
V V
Na L Q Q P P P T
V V

      (4-9) 
4.2.5 Length of critical segment for subsea pipeline area 
1. Crossing subsea pipeline  
Based on the ship-ship encounter scenario over a crossing subsea pipeline as shown in Figure 
4-1, izNa is considered using the following criterion: whether a ship-ship encounter occurs in the 
critical segment of the subsea pipeline area. 
In this proposed model, the length of critical segment for the crossing subsea pipeline area as 
in Eq.(4.11), czL , is approached based on a concept proposed by Weng et al.[41]. In Weng’s 
model, a ship-ship encounter is defined as a critical situation in which the subject ship is 
expected to enter the meeting ship’s domain in the next time interval ∆t. The distance to the 
meeting ship’s domain j is approximately three times the ship length. Thus, the encounter 
distance 
,d ij
L  for subject ship i encountering meeting ship j is expressed as follows: 
 
(1) (2) (2)
, ( ) 3d ij i j jL V V t L         (4-10) 
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where :  
 ∆t  :  the critical time interval of the subject ship that is expected to enter the meeting 
ship’s domain. 
 
(2)
jL   :  the length overall (LOA) of the meeting ship belonging to class j in fairway 2 
Hence, the length of critical segment for the crossing subsea pipeline area in zone z as shown 
in Figure 4-1, czL , is expressed as follows: 
 
(1) (2)
,
cz i j
d ij
L L L L        (4-11) 
 
where : 
  
(1)
iL   :  the LOA of the subject ship of class i in fairway 1 
 
(2)
jL   : that of the meeting ship of class j in fairway 2 
2. Parallel subsea pipeline  
The length of critical segment for the parallel subsea pipeline area in zone z as shown in 
Figure 4-2, czL , is estimated based on an effective length of the subsea pipeline in zone z that the 
pipeline is likely to be exposed to damage owing to a ship sinking. 
4.2.6 Causation probability  
Recently, the causation probability Pc has been estimated using two approaches: scenario 
approach and synthetics approach [27]. The scenario approach is calculated based on the 
statistics of available historical accident data. Pedersen and Zhang [42] argued that the scenario 
approach can be calculated from accident data at various locations and transformed to the 
analyzed location. The synthetics approach is calculated based on specific error situation analysis 
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that can occur on ships. In this approach, the probability of error situations can be estimated 
using some methods such as Bayesian networks or fault tree analysis [29].  
In this study, Pc is estimated based on the synthetics approach using a Bayesian network. 
The model Bayesian network is developed by modifying network fragments developed by Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV) [28] and Hänninen and Kujala [29]. The Bayesian network should reflect 
the specific characteristics of a studied location, which in this case is the Madura Strait area. 
Based on collision records in the Madura Strait area from Tanjung Perak Port Authority, on total 
of 18 accidents in 1997-2011, all ship-ship collisions are caused by ships losing control.  The 
major factors contributing to ships losing control based on the accident record were weather 
conditions, navigational aid detection, human performance, the pilot guiding the ships, 
communication with other ships, and steering failure. The Pc obtained using a Bayesian network 
model for practical application in the Madura Strait area is expressed as shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3 Bayesian Network Model of Causation Probability for Ship-Ship Collision in 
Madura Strait Area 
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4.2.7 Probability of ship foundering after collision 
A ship may undergo minor or major structural failures after collision. If a collision results in 
major structural failure, the ship may founder to the seabed. Recently, the probability of a ship 
foundering after collision has been estimated by two methods: analytical method and statistical 
method. As an analytical method, Otto et al. [43] developed a model by integrating the joint 
probability of the damage density function of the length, depth, and height of damage from the 
collision impact. As a statistical method, Fowler and Sorgård [37] estimated the probability of a 
ship foundering based on Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services (LMIS) data. 
In this study, the conditional probability of a ship foundering after collision is determined 
based on a statistical method. This method is reasonable for estimating the probability of a ship 
foundering using general ship data and is easy to use in practice [37]. The conditional probability 
of a ship foundering after collision 
fP  is expressed as follows: 
 
af
f
ac
N
P
N
       (4-12) 
where :  
 af
N   :  the number of actual ships foundering after collision in the fairway 
 ac
N
 
:  the number of actual ship collisions in the fairway.  
The data used in the analysis may contribute uncertainty because the actual data in specific 
area may have limited number of accidents. 
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4.3 Analysis and Results 
4.3.1 Subsea Pipeline Description 
An export subsea pipeline transports gas from the Poleng Processing Platform (PPP) to the 
Onshore Processing Facilities (OPF) near the Tanjung Perak Port, Surabaya. The pipeline 
description has been presented in the section 1.2. 
4.3.2 Ship Data from AIS Data 
In this study, the ship data that pass in the Madura Strait are taken from the AIS receiver in 
2008 to 2011. The ship data has been presented in the section 2.3. 
4.3.3 Ship Collision Location around Subsea Pipeline 
Ship-ship collision locations around the subsea pipeline are determined based on the ship-
ship encounter segment locations that are estimated based on the ship traffic distributions using 
AIS data. According to the ship traffic distribution analysis in the Madura Strait area, there are 
two hazardous locations from the viewpoint of the high risk of ship-ship collisions around the 
subsea pipeline: near KP35–KP36 (crossing pipeline) and near KP42–KP46 (crossing pipeline), 
as shown in Figure 4-4. In these locations, the subject and meeting ships are predicted to meet in 
an encounter segment around subsea pipeline area. In another crossing subsea pipeline location, 
KP64–OPF, the pipeline is buried to a depth of 19 m beneath the seabed using the horizontal 
directional drilling (HDD) method, and therefore, it is well protected.  
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Figure 4-4 Hazardous Locations around Subsea Pipeline in Madura Strait Area 
4.3.4 Ship Traffic Distribution Modeling  
The lateral probability distribution for arrival and departure from harbor in the Madura strait 
respectively are defined as southbound and northbound lateral traffic distribution. The selection 
of the fit distribution models are validated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The results of the 
southbound and northbound lateral traffic distribution model, and also the encounter segment for 
KP35–KP36 and KP42–KP46 are respectively shown in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6. The result of 
the lateral probability distributions are used to estimate the ze , 
(1)
ezP  and 
(2)
ezP . 
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Figure 4-5 Lateral Distribution Probability of Ship Traffic in KP35–KP36 
 
Figure 4-6 Lateral Distribution Probability of Ship Traffic in KP42–KP46 
4.3.5 Causation Probability in Madura Strait  
The causation probability Pc of ship-ship collisions over the subsea pipeline in the Madura 
Strait area is determined by using a Bayesian network, as shown in Figure 4-3. The values of the 
variables in the Bayesian network are estimated using data obtained from the Tanjung Perak Port 
Authority and external data related to the subject. 
The data from the Tanjung Perak Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Institute in 
2003-2012 is used to estimate the probability of weather conditions. The probability of weather 
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condition is presented in Table D-1 of Appendix D.  
The probability of visual detection or visibility is a conditional probability that is estimated 
based on the probability of the weather conditions. Good weather conditions are equivalent to 
good visibility (>1 nm). Thus, the logical conditional probability of visibility is 1 in good 
weather conditions. Strom/heavy rain conditions are equivalent to poor visibility (<1 nm). Thus, 
the logical conditional probability of visibility is reduced by 25% in Strom/heavy rain conditions 
[28].  The probability of visual detection is presented in Table D-2 of Appendix D. 
The probability of navigational aid detection describes the possibility of radar and AIS 
systems in functioning and being used to detect other ships.  The value of the probability of radar 
and AIS detection is estimated based on data from the Tanjung Perak Port Authority. The 
probability of navigational aid detection is presented in Table D-3 of Appendix D.  
The probability of a port pilot guiding a ship is adopted from the National Transportation 
Safety Committee of Indonesia reported in 2012 that has analyzed port pilot onboard to guide 
ship entering or exiting the Madura Strait [35]. The probability of pilot to guide ships in the 
Madura Strait area is presented in Table D-4 of Appendix D. 
The probability of communication with other ships indicates whether the Officer On Watch 
(OOW) receives a warning call from other ships on a collision course, e.g., on VHF. Based on 
data obtained from the Tanjung Perak Port Authority in 2005-2010, the probability of 
communication with other ships is presented in Table D-5 of Appendix D.  
The probability of vigilance is a conditional probability based on the probability of an on-
board port pilot and probability of communication with other ships. The on-board port pilot and 
communication with other ships provide internal and external vigilance that can warn the OOW 
of dangerous situations [28]. The logical conditional probability of vigilance is presented in 
Table D-6 of Appendix D.  
The probability of human performance is adapted from the result of Harahap et al.’s study of 
human performance for ships officer in the Madura Strait area [36]. The probability of human 
performance for ship-ship collision candidate in the Madura Strait area is presented in Table D-7 
of Appendix D.  
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The probability of ship steering failure in the Madura Strait area is estimated based on data 
from the Tanjung Perak Port Authority in 2005-2010. In that period, there were 174,927 ships 
passing in the Madura Strait and 6 of them experienced steering failure system.  The probability 
of ship steering failure is presented in Table D-8 of Appendix D. 
Thus, the causation probability of failing to avoid a collision Pc in the Madura Strait area is 
calculated to be 1.13 × 10
-4
 using the Bayesian network. 
4.3.6 Ship Sinking Frequency Over Subsea Pipeline 
The ship sinking frequency over the subsea pipeline for subject ship belonging to class i in 
zone z, izNs , is estimated using Eq.(4.2). The number of the head-on ship-ship collision 
candidates in the critical segment of the subsea pipeline area for subject ship belonging to class i 
in zone z, izNa , is estimated using Eq.(4.9). The value of the causation probability of failing to 
avoid a collision Pc  using Bayesian network model is 1.13 × 10
-4
. The average shipping traffic 
for each ship class per day is estimated based on the AIS data, as shown in Figure 4-7. For head-
on ship-ship collisions, the length of the critical segment for the crossing subsea pipeline area 
czL is calculated based on Eq.(4.11). The ship speed passing through in the Madura Strait is 
average 6 knots. Thus the value of ∆t is considered as 3 min for a low ship speed [41].  
The lateral probability distribution function 
( 1,2) ( )zf y

 and the range of the ship-ship 
encounter segment 
ze as shown in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 for location of KP35–KP36 and 
KP42–KP46. The length and width of the ships in the Madura Strait area is presented in the 
section 2.3, Table 2-2. The conditional probability of a ship foundering after collision fP  is 
estimated based on Eq.(4.12) using historical accident data for the Madura Strait area. Based on 
data from Tanjung Perak Port Authority, there are 18 ship-ship collision accidents and only 6 
ships foundering after collision in 1997-2011.  Thus, fP in the Madura Strait area is 0.34. Many 
local ships belonging Indonesia flag are old ships that are maintained below standard [44].  
Implementation of SOLAS regulation should be maintained continuously to ensure the ship 
safety. Based on ship data in the Madura Strait gathered using AIS combined with ship data from 
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Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia (BKI), in January-June 2009, there are 30% of ships having age 
between 25-35 years, and 15% are 35-40 years.  
The results of the ship sinking frequency over the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait area,
izNs , are shown in Figure 4-7 for all ship classes i in the location of KP35–KP36 and KP42–
KP46. The frequency ranking is assessed based on the recommended practice of DNV-RP-F107. 
Figure 4-7 shows that KP35–KP36 has higher ship sinking frequency than KP42–KP46. These 
are reasonable results because KP35–KP36 has narrower fairway than KP42–KP46.   
In general results, several ship types such as Bulk Carrier (Handysize), General Cargo 
(Small), General Cargo (Medium), Container (Small Feeder), Container (Feeder), and Tanker 
(Medium Range) have higher risk than other ships (Bulk Carrier, Passenger ship, Tugboat etc) in 
the Madura Strait.  Furthermore, for KP35–KP36, izNs for General Cargo (Small), General Cargo 
(Medium), and Container (Small Feeder) classes are within the low-frequency ranking, level 2 
(10
-4
 ≥  X > 10-5). For KP42–KP46, izNs  for all ship classes are within the low-frequency 
ranking, level 1 (<10
-5
). 
 
Figure 4-7 Ship Sinking Frequency per year for KP35–KP36 and KP42–KP46 
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4.4 Validation 
The subsea gas pipeline is a new structure in the Madura Strait area. Its construction was 
completed in 2008. The causation probability of failing to avoid a collision Pc, as described in 
the previous section, is estimated to be 1.13 × 10
-4
. The numbers of ships sinking using proposed 
model in 1997-2011 are estimated using proposed model (Ns) to be 2 ships whereas the actual 
numbers (Ns-actual) of ships sinking are 6 ships based on the data from Tanjung Perak Port 
Authority. However, analysis of model validity by comparing with accidents statistic have 
uncertainty due to the limited number of such events. Therefore other models to estimate the ship 
sinking frequency in the Madura Strait can be used as comparison with the proposed model. The 
other model used in this analysis is the Kristiansen’s model[39]. The results of the comparison 
between number of ships sinking using proposed model, Kristiansen’s model, and actual data 
accidents in 1997-2011 are presented as in Table 4-1.  
Table 4-1 Results of Comparison between Ns based on Proposed Model with Kristiansen’s 
model and Ns-actual based on Accident Records 
Years 
Ns 
(Proposed 
model) 
Ns1 
(Kristiansen’s  
model) 
Ns-actual 
(Actual 
accidents) 
Ratio 
(
proposed model
actual accidents
) 
1987–2011 2 1.18 6 0.33 
 
The analyses of ratio values between proposed model with actual accidents are approached 
based on agreements criteria used by Fowler and Sorgård [37]. The criteria consist of three 
categories: 1) good agreement (1>ratio≥0.50) or (1<ratio≤2), 2) reasonable agreement 
(0.50>ratio≥0.20) or (2<ratio≤5), 3) poor agreement (ratio <0.20) or (ratio>5).  Thus, the ratio 
value of the proposed model compared with actual accident is considered to be 0.33 or to be 
reasonably agreement (ratio ≥ 0.20). 
The result of ratio between the proposed model and the actual accidents have quite 
differences. A reason for this difference is that the proposed model uses assumption that all 
traffic intensity is spread uniformly over all day. This is not quite the same situation in actual 
condition that traffic intensity can increase during in particular period of the day. When the 
 63 
traffic intensity increases significantly, the probability of encounter is higher than in assumption 
in the proposed model.  Another reason, the network variable to estimate Pc is quite simple. In 
the future work, it is important to elaborate the network variable of the Bayesian network to 
improve the estimation of Pc. 
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4.5 Discussion 
The ship sinking over subsea pipeline in Madura strait is one of critical issue because it can 
make rapture of the subsea pipeline. Such damage may result in potential risks to people, 
environments, and economic loss. Based on historical data, 6 ships have been sinking after 
collision with other ships in the fairway of the Madura Strait.  
The scenario of a ship sinking and damaging the subsea pipeline is considered based on ship-
ship collision when the ships are moving over the critical subsea pipeline area. After the ships 
collide, extensive damage to their hulls may cause them to sink and damage the pipeline.  
This Chapter proposes a model based on analysis of the accident of the ship-ship collision 
over subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait of Indonesia. Based on the accident scenario as above, 
this proposed model is developed by considering some aspects as following: the analysis of the 
ship-ship collision over the critical subsea pipeline area and usage of the AIS data to develop the 
ship traffic modeling around the subsea pipeline. 
The proposed model uses the mathematical approach that is inspired by Fujii's model. The 
mathematical approach represents the behavior of real phenomena or objects in mathematical 
terms, and they can be applied to predict the frequency of accidents in the future when the 
situation may differ from today. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter proposes a model for estimating the ship sinking frequency over a subsea 
pipeline in the Madura Strait area. The following conclusion are derived from this Chapter:  
1 This Chapter proposes a model for estimating the ship sinking frequency due to ship-ship 
collisions over a subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait area based on Fujii’s model.  
2 AIS data is used for estimating a hazard location around the subsea pipeline, probability 
of the ships passing over a encounter segment of a subsea pipeline
( )
ezP

, and geometrical 
collision probability gzP . 
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3 The length of critical segment for the crossing subsea pipeline area in zone z, czL  is 
determined based on the concept proposed by Weng et al. In Weng’s method, ship 
conflict is defined as a critical situation in which a ship is expected to enter another ship’s 
domain in the next time interval (∆t = 3 min) at low speed. The length of a ship’s domain 
is approximately three times its length. 
4 The method for estimating the causation probability of failing to avoid a collision Pc is 
based on a synthetics approach using a Bayesian network. The model network of the 
Bayesian network in the Madura Strait area is developed based on a modification of 
DNV’s and Hänninen’s models. Most ship collisions in the Madura Strait area are caused 
by ships losing control. Based on historical accident data, the main contributing factors 
considered in the Bayesian network for the Madura Strait area are weather, human 
performance, pilot vigilance, communication, and navigation. The causation probability 
of ship-ship collisions in the Madura Strait area Pc is calculated to be 1.13 × 10
-4
. 
5 For KP35–KP36, the ship sinking frequency for General Cargo (Small), General Cargo 
(Medium), and Container (Small Feeder) classes over the subsea pipeline per year is 
determined to fall into the low-frequency ranking, level 2 (10
-4
 ≥ X > 10-5). For KP42–
KP46, the ship sinking frequency for all ship classes over the subsea pipeline per year is 
determined to fall into the low-frequency ranking, level 1 (<10
-5
). The frequency ranking 
is based on DNV RP-F107.  
6 The validation analysis of the proposed model is calculated by comparing between 
number of ships sinking using proposed model and actual data accidents during specific 
period between 1997 and 2011. The result of the comparison is 0.33 that can be 
determined as reasonably agreement (ratio    0.20). Another model, Kristiansen’s model 
is also applied in validation analysis. The results of two models: proposed model and 
Kristiansen’s model show that the proposed model have values are closer the actual 
historical accident than the values from Kristiansen’s model. This means that the 
proposed models and usage of AIS data and Bayesian network represent the behavior of 
real phenomena or objects in mathematical terms. Therefore, the proposed method can be 
applied to predict the ship sinking frequency in critical subsea pipeline area in the future 
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even if the situation may differ from today.  The proposed method also can be used to 
evaluation of mitigation effectiveness to reduce risk ranking. Based on this reason, we 
argue that the usage AIS data is importance in this matter. 
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5. hgfh 
Chapter 5 
Consequence Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
There are serious threats due to ship traffics on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait area. 
The subsea pipeline safety is very critical issue because it is likely to be exposed to damage by 
ship activities. This Chapter presents consequences analysis of gas release from gas subsea 
pipeline on the busy ship traffic in the Madura Strait. Some parameters are considered in this 
analysis such as gas properties, gas release scenario, environment condition, and ship traffic 
distribution. 
5.2 Usage of AIS for Consequence Analysis 
The usage of the AIS data combined with the GIS is useful to analyze the ship traffic 
distribution as basis to analyze a potency of ship in dangerous situation when the gas is released 
from the subsea pipeline. The ship data that pass in the Madura Strait are taken from the AIS 
receiver in 2008 to 2011. The ship data for principle dimensions have been presented in the 
section 2.3 whereas for modeling the ship traffic distributions have been presented in the section 
2.4. 
5.3 Consequence of Gas Release from Subsea Pipeline 
In general, subsea pipelines are generally buried and incidents are relatively rare, however the 
risk cannot be ignored on a operational phase in areas of busy ship traffic. There are some 
possibilities of the subsea pipelines suffering leaks or ruptures. Threats to pipeline integrity can 
be categorized into four major groups such as damage due to third party, corrosion, incorrect 
 68 
design, and incorrect operation.  
The damage from third-party refers to any accidental damage occurred to the subsea pipeline 
as a result of activities of personnel not associated with the pipeline. This failure mode is also 
sometimes called outside force or external force. In the Madura Strait, the heavy ship traffics 
around the subsea pipeline can be considered as a threat to the subsea pipeline. The threat from 
ship anchoring and ship sinking are major threat that can make subsea pipeline rupture [4][5]. 
The natural gas of the dispersion, and consequently the hazard, will depend on the momentum 
of release at the sea surface. At lower depths and high release rates, the natural gas will have 
sufficient momentum at the sea surface to result in a momentum jet. In the case of small release, 
the gas will lose all its momentum and will disperse when it reach at the sea surface. In order to 
occur a fire, the gas release must reach an ignition source while still at a flammable 
concentration. The ignition source is expected only from marine traffic, either from the ships 
approaching the scene of the incident or from the ships that cause the subsea pipeline damage, 
which may still be present in the vicinity [45]. 
The Madura Strait area has low depth of the fairway. If the natural gas is accidentally released 
from the subsea pipeline in that area, the hazard to ship traffic may be occurred.  
5.4 Estimation of Subsea Gas Release 
Subsea gas release from leakages or ruptures of the subsea pipeline can result gas plumes 
formation. In this study, the behavior of gas release from subsea pipelines is predicted using the 
Shell FRED modeling software that have been developed by Shell Global Solution [46]. The 
Shell FRED can estimate plume radius and flammable region at sea surface. The Shell FRED 
determine behavior of gas release from subsea pipeline depending on some parameters such as 
gas density, lower flammable limit concentration, mass flux of release gas, water depth and 
temperature, and wind speed. 
Here, the gas density at specific temperature and hydrostatic pressure based on ideal gas (
0 ) 
is presented as following equation [47]: 
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Besides, the gas density at specific temperature and gas pressure (atm) based on ideal gas (
1
 ) 
is presented as following equation: 
 
 1
273 15
273
atm
s
p 

 
  
 
     (5-2) 
 
where : 
    :  ideal gas density at pressure 1 atm and temperature 15oC (kg/m3)  
 atmp   : gas pressure (atm) 
 0H   :  discharge depth (m)  
 s  :  sea temperature (0C) 
The mass of gas in the pipeline (
1
m ) can be calculated using parameters the pipeline volume 
and the gas density at specific pressure and temperature as following equation: 
 
1 1m V       (5-3) 
 
where V is pipeline volume (m
3
) where the gas flows in the pipeline. 
The mass of inlet gas that flows into the pipeline ( 2m ) can be calculated using parameter inlet 
mass flux multiple time as following equation: 
 70 
2 inletm q t        (5-4) 
 
where 
inletq is the inlet mass flux of gas (kg/s), t  is time (s).  
The gas release duration (T) can be estimated as following equation: 
 
total
release
m
T
q
       (5-5) 
 
where : 
 total
m   : total mass in the pipeline consisted 
1
m  and 2m  (kg) 
 release
q :  mass flux of release gas (kg/s) 
5.5 Gas Release Scenario and Primary Parameters 
In this study, the consequence of subsea gas pipeline accident is approached based on gas 
release effect from the subsea pipeline on the ship traffic. The behavior of gas release from 
subsea pipelines is predicted using Shell FRED modeling software. The Shell FRED can 
estimate flammable region at sea surface based on the gas concentration on the Lower 
Flammable Limit (LFL)[47].  
The scenario of gas release accident from the pipeline in this case is modeled based on 
assumption that the subsea pipeline leak or rupture caused by external object impact. Therefore, 
the release flow rates are assumed by 3 scenarios [48]: low, medium, and high. The emergency 
shutdown will be carried out by close the main valve within around 1 minute. The residual gas 
that is trapped in the pipeline will release to sea surface. The primary parameters to analyze the 
gas release in the Madura Strait are presented in the Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1 Primary Parameters for Gas Analysis in the Madura Strait 
Primary parameters Data 
Environment condition 
Depth of seawater 10 m 
Sea temperature 25 °C 
Wind speed 2.79 m/s 
Humidity 70% 
Pipeline dimension 
Outside diameter 0.41 m 
Inside diameter 0.38 m 
Inlet gas condition 
Service fluid Methane Gas 
Density at 15 °C 0.68 kg/m3 
Inlet gas flow 
115.80 
MMSCFD 
Inlet temperature 48.89 °C 
Pressure 300 psig 
Gas release scenario 
Release flow rate (Low) 5.44 kg/s 
Release flow rate (medium) 15.62 kg/s 
Release flow rate (high) 25.81 kg/s 
LFL Concentration 5% 
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5.6 Analysis and Conclusion 
5.6.1 Analysis of Horizontal Hazard Range around the Subsea Pipeline 
The flammable region or horizontal hazard range is taken as distance to 0.5 LFL. The use of 
0.5 LFL rather than LFL is due to uncertainties regarding the ignition of gas-air mixture and is a 
safety factor that accounts for effects such as the instantaneous concentration of dispersed plume 
being higher than averaged mean concentration from the model [45]. The result of horizontal 
hazard ranges based on the release gas scenarios are presented in the Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2 Horizontal hazard ranges. 
Gas release scenarios 
Horizontal hazard ranges (m) 
LFL 0.5 LFL 
Release flow rate (Low) 47.55 70.76 
Release flow rate (medium) 59.25 87.92 
Release flow rate (high) 65.81 97.50 
 
In the analysis of the ship traffic around hazard area, the ship trajectories are represented 
visually by a series of waypoints that are plotted in the Madura Strait map using the GIS 
software. The waypoints are obtained from AIS data for the ships in the Madura Strait area.  
In this analysis, there are possibility of the ships trajectories passing in the hazard subsea 
pipeline area, as shown in the Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2. Besides, there are two crossing areas of 
the subsea pipeline and ship trajectories as shown in the Figure 5-1.  
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Figure 5-1 Ship Trajectories around Hazard Area in the Location of KP36 to KP 50 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Ship Trajectories around Hazard area in the Location of KP54 to OPF 
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5.6.2 Analysis of Critical Gas Release Duration and Ship Traffic Condition 
The estimation of the critical gas release durations are depended on scenario of release flow 
rate and amount gas that is trapped in the pipeline using Eq.(5.5). The result of gas release 
duration is presented as shown in the Figure 5-3.  
 
Figure 5-3 The gas release duration based on release flow rate scenarios. 
 
The average numbers of the ships passing in the Madura Strait area are about 3.65 ships per 
hour. In the low case scenario, the low flow rate, the result of gas release duration is estimated 
average about 4.50 hours.  In the medium case scenario, the medium flow rate, the result of gas 
release duration is estimated average about 1.55 hours.  In the worst case scenario, the high flow 
rate, the result of gas release duration is estimated about 1 hour.   
5.7 Discussion 
This Chapter presents the consequences analysis of gas release from gas subsea pipeline on 
the busy ship traffic in the Madura Strait. The heavy ship traffics around the subsea pipeline in 
the Madura Strait can be considered as a threat to the subsea pipeline. The threats from the 
dragged anchor and ship sinking are the potential threat that can make subsea pipeline rupture. 
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Some parameters are considered in this analysis such as gas properties, gas release scenario, 
environment condition, and ship traffic distribution.  
The scenario of the release flow rates are assumed by 3 scenarios: low, medium, and high. 
The emergency shutdown will be carried out by close the main valve within around 1 minute. 
The residual gas that is trapped in the pipeline will release to sea surface. 
The usage of the AIS data combined with the GIS is useful to analyze the ship traffic 
distribution as basis to analyze a potency of ship in dangerous situation when the gas is released 
from the subsea pipeline.  
The flammable region or horizontal hazard range is taken as distance to 0.5 LFL. The use of 
0.5 LFL rather than LFL is due to uncertainties regarding the ignition of gas-air mixture and is a 
safety factor that accounts for effects such as the instantaneous concentration of dispersed plume 
being higher than averaged mean concentration from the model 
5.8 Conclusion 
This study presents method to estimate the subsea gas pipeline accident consequence in the 
Madura Strait area using AIS data. The conclusion of this study are as follows:  
1. In this Chapter, the consequence analysis of the subsea gas pipeline accident in the 
Madura Strait is approached based on gas release effect from the subsea pipeline on the 
ship traffic. The AIS data is used to analysis the ship traffics around the hazard area of 
the subsea pipeline.  
2. In the analysis of the ship traffic analysis using AIS data, there are possibilities of the 
ships passing in the flammable region around the subsea pipeline. The flammable region 
or horizontal hazard range is estimated about 97.50 meters (based on 0.5 LFL).  
3. In the worst scenario, the high flow rate, the result of gas release duration is estimated 
about 1 hour. The subject ship that causes the pipeline rupture has possibility to be 
stricken the gas dispersion.  The average numbers of the ships passing in the Madura 
Strait based on the AIS data are about 3.65 ships per hour. In this situation, the some 
ships are possible to enter in dangerous situation.  
 76 
4. For safety of the ship traffics in the Madura Strait, it is important to consider the gas 
release consequences analysis to develop the navigation buoys marker and navigation 
map around the subsea pipeline.  
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6. ghfhf 
Chapter 6 
Risk Ranking of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
6.1 Introduction 
The methodology for the evaluation of risk ranking on subsea pipeline is adopted based on 
the recommended practice from DNV-RP-F107 [12]. This rule uses the risk matrix that involves 
making judgments of frequency ranking of occurrence and consequence ranking. This matrix 
includes the five category rankings covering from low to high for both the frequency ranking and 
the consequence ranking. Besides, this matrix has the risk tolerability criteria (i.e. high – 
unacceptable risks, low – broadly acceptable risks, and the area in between - medium - the 
ALARP or tolerability region) as shown in Figure 6-1. The matrix is used as a tool for 
qualitatively screening the risk level posed by identified threats. 
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Figure 6-1 Risk Matrix adopted from Rule of DNV-RP-F107 
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6.2 Frequency rankings  
In the risk analysis context, estimation of the accident frequency is one of the vital elements. 
The important step in risk analysis is determining a frequency ranking of each threat that has 
been identified previously. For subsea pipeline, the frequency ranking can use the risk matrix 
from the recommended practice of DNV RP-F107 [12] as shown in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1 Frequency Ranking for Subsea Pipeline by DNV RP-F107  
Frequency 
category 
Description Annual 
frequency 
1 (low) So low frequency that event considered negligible. ≤10-5 
2 Event rarely expected to occur. 10
-4
 ≥x>10-5 
3 (medium) 
Event individually not expected to happen, but when 
summarized over a large number of pipelines have the 
credibility to happen once a year. 
10
-3≥x>10-4 
4 
Event individually may be expected to occur during the 
lifetime of the pipeline. 
10
-2
 ≥x>10-3 
5 (high) 
Event individually may be expected to occur more than 
once during lifetime. 
>10
-2
 
 
6.2.1 Results of Frequency Ranking for Dragged Anchor on Subsea Pipeline 
Layouts of the subsea pipeline in the Madura strait are placed in the crossing position and 
parallel position in the fairway as shown in the Figure 1-2. The estimation of the dragged anchor 
frequency per year on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait has been carried out using 
proposed method as description in the Chapter 3. The ship traffic data used in the analysis is 
obtained from the AIS data for the Madura Strait in 2008-2011. 
The results for the yearly frequency of dragging an anchor on the subsea pipeline in the 
Madura Strait can be summarized as shown in Table 6-2. The assessment of the frequency 
ranking is performed based on the recommended practice of DNV-RP-F107. 
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Table 6-2 Frequency Ranking of Dragged Anchor on the Subsea Pipeline in Madura Strait 
Ship category Type of ship Level of dragged anchor frequency on 
the pipeline 
Merchant ship Bulk carrier (Handysize) 
Bulk carrier (Handymax) 
General cargo (Small) 
General cargo (Medium) 
Container (Small feeder) 
Container (Feeder) 
Passenger (Small) 
Passenger (Mediun) 
Tanker (Small) 
Tanker (General purpose) 
Tanker (Medium range) 
Group A1: 
General cargo (Small and Medium), 
Container (Small feeder) are determined 
fall into high-frequency ranking or level 
4 (10
-2
 > x > 10
-3
). 
Group A2: 
Bulk carrier (Handysize and 
Handymax), Container (Small feeder 
and feeder), Passenger (Small and 
Medium), Tanker (Small, General 
purpose, and Medium) are determined 
fall into medium-frequency ranking or 
level 3 (10
-3
 > x > 10
-4
). 
Service ships and 
navy ship 
Tug boat (Medium) 
Supply vessel (Medium) 
Navy/Patrol (Medium) 
Other ship (Medium) 
Group A3: 
Supply vessel (Medium) and Other ship 
(Medium) are determined fall into low-
frequency ranking or level 2  (10
-4
 > x > 
10
-5
). 
Group A4: 
Navy/Patrol (Medium) is determined 
fall into very low-frequency ranking or 
level 1 (less than 10
-5
). 
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6.2.2 Results of Frequency Ranking for Ship Sinking over Subsea Pipeline 
The estimation of the ship sinking frequency over the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
has been performed using proposed model as description in the Chapter 4.  The ship traffic data 
used in the analysis is obtained from the AIS data for the Madura Strait in 2008-2011. 
The results for the yearly frequency of ship sinking over the subsea pipeline in the Madura 
Strait are presented as shown in Table 6-3. The assessment of the frequency ranking is performed 
based on the recommended practice of DNV-RP-F107. 
Table 6-3 Frequency Ranking of Ship Sinking over the Subsea Pipeline in Madura Strait 
Ship category Type of ship Level of ship sinking  frequency over 
the pipeline 
Merchant ship Bulk carrier (Handysize) 
Bulk carrier (Handymax) 
General cargo (small) 
General cargo (Medium) 
Container (Small feeder) 
Container (feeder) 
Passenger (Small) 
Passenger (Mediun) 
Tanker (Small) 
Tanker (General purpose) 
Tanker (Medium range) 
Group B1: 
General cargo (Small and Medium) and 
Container (Small Feeder) are 
determined fall into low-frequency 
ranking or level 2  (10
-4
 > x > 10
-5
). 
Group B2: 
Bulk carrier (Handysize and 
Handymax), Container (Feeder), 
Passenger (Small and Medium), Tanker 
(Small, General purpose, and Medium) 
are determined fall into very low-
frequency ranking or level 1 (less than 
10
-5
). 
Service ships and 
navy ship 
Tug Boat (Medium) 
Supply vessel (Medium) 
Navy/Patrol (Medium) 
Other ship (Medium) 
Group B3: 
All the ships are determined fall into 
very low-frequency ranking or level 1 
(less than 10
-5
). 
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6.3 Consequence Rankings 
There are some possibilities of the subsea pipelines suffering leaks or damage caused by 
third-party. The damage from third-party refers to any accidental damage occurred to the subsea 
pipeline as a result of activities from third-party. 
When the subsea pipeline gets leakages or ruptures, the natural gas will release from the 
subsea pipeline to surface. Based on this, consequence analysis of subsea gas pipeline accident is 
approached based on gas release effect from the subsea pipeline on the ship traffic. The behavior 
of gas release from subsea pipelines and consequences analysis of gas release from gas subsea 
pipeline in the Madura Strait are presented as shown in Chapter 5.  
The potential consequences of accidental events to subsea pipelines in the Madura Strait are 
established with consideration human safety and economic loss. For consequence on 
environment, the natural gas travelling through the water is not expected to have an impact on 
marine mammals, as it is not toxic; a local reduction of oxygen content in the water column 
would be very temporary. The consequences ranking is assessed based on the recommended 
practice of DNV-RP-F107. 
6.3.1 Consequence Ranking of Human Safety  
In the Madura Strait, the gas release from the subsea pipeline can be potential to be ignited 
fire or an explosion caused by interactions with ship. Ignition will only occur if the gas 
dispersion above the sea surface is of flammable concentration on the 0.5 Lower Flammable 
Limit (LFL) and the ignition sources are present within this dispersion. The use of 0.5 LFL 
rather than LFL is due to uncertainties regarding the ignition of gas-air mixture and is a safety 
factor that accounts for effects such as the instantaneous concentration of dispersed plume being 
higher than averaged mean concentration from the model [45]. 
At lower depths, as in Madura Strait, and high release rates, the gas dispersion from subsea 
pipeline can endanger a ship that pass through near the release point. In the case of small release, 
the gas dispersion will lose all its momentum and will disperse when it reach at the sea surface. 
Analysis of gas releases consequence to ship traffic in the Madura Strait is presented in Chapter 
5. 
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The results for human safety consequences of gas released from subsea pipeline are classified 
as shown in Table 6-4. The assessment of consequences ranking is performed based on the 
recommended practice of DNV-RP-F107. Note that for the proposed ranking category 2 and 4 
are not used for human safety consequence ranking [12].   
Table 6-4 Consequence Ranking adopted from Rule of DNV-RP-F107 
Ranking category Description 
1 (low) No person(s) are injured 
2 (not used) 
3 (medium) Serious injury, one fatality (working accident) 
4 (not used) 
5 (high) More than one fatality (gas cloud ignition) 
 
Based on analysis of gas release from subsea pipeline as in Chapter 5, the gas dispersion to 
sea surface will take the time duration about 1 hour. In this situation, the gas dispersion may 
expose ships at surface. For instance, a ship drops a emergency anchor and then the anchor drags 
subsea pipeline, then the ship can be possible to be trapped in the dangerous area, flammable 
region.  
The flammable region or the horizontal hazard range that is taken as distance to 0.5 LFL for 
worst-case scenario is about 97.50 meter. The average numbers of the ships passing in the 
Madura Strait based on the AIS data are about 3.65 ships per hour.  
It can conclude that ships are possible to be trapped in the dangerous situation when the 
subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait is ruptured. The gas trapped in ship room can be potential to 
make crew and passenger getting injured.  
The ranking result of human safety consequences for the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
can be determined fall into medium level ranking or level 3 based on DNV-RP-F107. 
 83 
6.3.2 Consequence Ranking of Economic  
The economic consequence of damage to pipelines can be classified with respect to the delay 
in production and economic loss of a third party. In generally, the components of cost consist of 
a production delay, repairing cost, penalty cost from third party.   
In general, repairing a subsea pipeline is a time consuming. The work will normally take 
approximately one to three months to complete, as all works are performed subsea. The actual 
duration is however strongly dependent on time to mobilize, the efficiency of repair systems and 
the weather conditions. The economic consequence ranking can be classified as shown in Table 
6-5 [12]. 
Table 6-5 Economic Consequence Ranking adopted from Rule of DNV-RP-F107 
Ranking 
category 
Description Production 
delay/ 
Downtime 
1 (low) Insignificant effect on operation, small or insignificant cost of repair 0 days 
2 
Repair can be deferred until scheduled shutdown, some repair costs 
will occur 
<1 month 
3 (medium) 
Failure cause extended unscheduled loss of facility or system and 
significant repair costs. 
Rectification requires unscheduled underwater operation with 
prequalified repair system before further production. 
1-3 months 
4 
Failure cause indefinite shutdown and significant facility or system 
failure costs. 
Rectification requires unscheduled underwater operation without pre-
qualified repair system before further production. 
Failure resulting in shorter periods of shutdown of major part of (or all 
of) the hydrocarbon production for the field. 
3-12 months 
5 (high) 
Total loss of pipeline and possible also loss of other structural parts of 
the platform.  
Large cost of repair including long time of shot down of production. 
Failure resulting in shut down of the total hydrocarbon production for a 
longer period. 
1-3 years 
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If there is subsea pipeline accident in the Madura Strait, the gas production delay of the 
pipeline is approximately 117.53 MMBTU (Million Metric British Thermal Units) for the 
average daily flow [48]. The natural gas spot prices averaged is USD 3.53 per MMBTU in April 
2013[49]. If total repairing time is assumed 1 month, it can be estimated that the loss of gas sales 
revenue during non-delivery to the buyer is about USD. 490,087.59 per day or USD  
14,702,627.70 in one months. The penalty cost from third party is determined based on sales 
contract scheme between gas operator with a buyer. The repairing cost is depended on a 
significant amount of technology and equipments used, man-hour cost, material, ect. It is 
difficult within the confines of this section to go into the details costs as this will be very much 
dependant on the specifics of the situation under consideration. 
In conclusion, the economic consequence ranking of the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
can be determined fall into medium level ranking or level 3 based on DNV-RP-F107. 
6.4 Result of Risk Analysis 
The important step in risk analysis is determining a risk ranking of each threat that has been 
identified previously. The risk ranking is determined by combining frequency ranking and 
consequence ranking and then comparing the result against acceptance criteria in a risk matrix. 
For subsea pipeline, the acceptance criteria can use the recommended practice of DNV RP-F107 
that consists of: 
1. Not acceptable  
2. As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)  
3. Acceptable  
The use of DNV codes has been an established practice for subsea pipeline for the last several 
decades.  
The final results of risk ranking of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait for threats from 
dragged anchor and ship sinking over the subsea pipeline are presented as shown in Figures 6-2, 
6-3, 6-4, and 6-5. 
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Figure 6-2 presents matrix of risk ranking of human safety consequence due to dragged 
anchor on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. In this matrix, the frequency ranking of 
dragged anchor on the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 6.2.1 and  the consequence 
ranking of human safety for dragged anchor on the subsea pipeline have been presented in 
section 6.3.1.  
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Figure 6-2 Risk Ranking of Human Safety Consequence due to Dragged Anchor on the 
Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
  
 86 
Figure 6-3 presents matrix of risk ranking of economic consequence due to dragged anchor 
on the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. In this matrix, the frequency ranking of dragged 
anchor on the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 6.2.1 and  the consequence ranking 
of economic for dragged anchor on the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 6.3.2. 
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Figure 6-3 Risk Ranking of Economic Consequence due to Dragged Anchor on the Subsea 
Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
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Figure 6-4 presents matrix of risk ranking of human safety consequence due to ship sinking 
over the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. In this matrix, the frequency ranking of ship 
sinking over the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 6.2.2 and  the consequence 
ranking of human safety for ship sinking over the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 
6.3.1. 
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Figure 6-4  Risk Ranking of Human Safety Consequence Due to Ship Sinking over the 
Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
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Figure 6-5 presents matrix of risk ranking of economic consequence due to ship sinking over 
the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. In this matrix, the frequency ranking of ship sinking 
over the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 6.2.2 and  the consequence ranking of 
economic for ship sinking over the subsea pipeline have been presented in section 6.3.2. 
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Figure 6-5 Risk Ranking of Economic Consequence due to Ship Sinking over the Subsea 
Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
  
 89 
6.5 Discussion 
The important step in risk analysis is determining the risk ranking of each threat that has 
been identified previously. In this Chapter, The methodology for the evaluation of risk ranking 
on subsea pipeline is adopted based on the recommended practice from DNV-RP-F107. This rule 
uses the risk matrix that involves making judgments of frequency ranking of occurrence and 
consequence ranking. This matrix includes the five category rankings covering from low to high 
for both the frequency ranking and the consequence ranking. 
The analysis of the frequency ranking of accidental events to subsea pipelines in the Madura 
Strait are established for threats from dragged anchor and ship sinking over the subsea pipeline. 
The analysis of frequency ranking of each threat has been performed in Chapter previously. 
The analysis of the consequences ranking of accidental events to subsea pipelines in the 
Madura Strait are established with consideration human safety and economic loss. For 
consequence on environment, the natural gas travelling through the water is not expected to have 
an impact on marine mammals, as it is not toxic; a local reduction of oxygen content in the water 
column would be very temporary. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter presents the final results of risk ranking of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
due to dragged anchor and ship sinking accidents based on DNV-RP-F107 as shown on Figures 
6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5.  
 
1. The risk rankings of subsea pipeline due to the dragged anchor accident for the merchant 
ship categories in the ship group of the A1 (General Cargo (small and medium), and 
Container (small feeder)) have been determined fall into the Not Acceptable region for 
human safety consequence (A1-H) and economic consequence (A1-E).  
 
2. The risk rankings of subsea pipeline due to the dragged anchor accident for the merchant 
ship categories in the ship group of the A2 (Bulk Carrier (Handysize and Handymax), 
Container (Feeder), Passenger (Small and Medium), and Tanker (Small, General Purpose, 
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and Medium Range)) have been determined fall into the ALARP region for human safety 
consequence (A2-H) and economic consequence (A2-E). 
 
3. The risk rankings of subsea pipeline due to the dragged anchor accident for the service 
and navy ship categories  in the ship group of the A3 (Supply Vessel (Medium) and the 
Other Ship (Medium)) and A4 (Navy/Patrol Ship) have been determined to fall into the 
Acceptable region for human safety consequence (A3-H), (A4-H) and economic 
consequence (A3-E),(A4-E). 
 
4. The risk rankings of subsea pipeline due to the ship sinking accident for all ship groups 
(B1-H, B2-H, B3-H, and B1-E, B2-E, B3-E) for the merchant and the service and navy 
ship categories have been determined fall into the Acceptable region for human safety 
consequence and economic consequence.  
 
5. For safety of the ship traffics in the Madura Strait, the result of risk ranking can be used 
to evaluation of mitigation effectiveness to reduce the high risk ranking. Mitigating 
activities are measures taken to reduce the likelihood of failure or the consequence of 
failures. 
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7. jhodjho 
Chapter 7 
Mitigation of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
7.1 Introduction 
The challenge with using a subsea pipeline for natural gas distribution is transportation 
security and environmental protection. The subsea pipelines located near busy port areas are 
likely to be exposed to the risk of damage. For instance, a passing ship could potentially drop an 
emergency anchor on a subsea pipeline, or debris from a ship–ship collision could sink and fall 
over a pipeline, causing a rupture in the subsea pipeline.  During operation of the subsea pipeline, 
the results of risk analysis may show number of potential risks that need to be mitigated to 
ensure the risk level to third parties and the environment remain at the tolerable level. 
Mitigation is important element of safety management, involving the implementation of 
actions to reduce risk level or maintain risk at the Acceptance level. Mitigating activities are 
measures taken to reduce the likelihood of failure or the consequence of failures [13]. In 
mitigation measures, all reasonably practicable mitigations must be taken to eliminate or reduce 
each risk. 
In this section, the mitigation measures are proposed based the results of risk analysis of the 
subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait as presented in Chapter 6, section 6.4. The results show that 
the subsea pipeline has possibility to be exposed to damage owing to dragging anchors. 
Therefore, the proposed mitigation measures are developed in order to reduce the potency of the 
subsea pipeline damage due to dragged anchor.  
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The scope of the mitigation measures are established in this section briefly as follows: 
a. To propose all the possible mitigation measures associated with the subsea pipeline 
installation in the Madura Strait, in particular the potential risks due to dragged anchor. 
b. To perform trade-off analysis for all alternative mitigation measures. 
7.2 Usage of AIS for Mitigation and Control 
The usage of the AIS data combined with the GIS is useful to analyze the ship traffic 
distributions around subsea pipeline that are considered in developing the mitigation measures of 
subsea pipeline. The ship traffic distributions and ship principle dimensions are used to plan new 
location of the subsea pipeline, mechanical pipeline protection, fixing Aids to Navigation near 
subsea pipeline, and improving a pilotage management, planning the routine patrol near subsea 
pipeline, and ect. The ship data for modeling the ship traffic distributions and number of ships 
passing in the Madura Strait are taken from the AIS receiver in 2008 to 2011. The ship data 
including the ship principle dimensions are gathered from Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia data and 
Tanjung Perak Port Authority data. The ship data for principle dimensions have been presented 
in the section 2.3 whereas for modeling the ship traffic distributions have been presented in the 
section 2.4. 
7.3 Bathymetry Survey and Soils Data  
Seafloor bathymetry survey data provide important information on seafloor conditions that 
are required to design pipeline routing, alignment, spanning, and pipeline mechanical protection 
methods. The subsea pipeline should be routed away from any seafloor obstructions and external 
hazards. The pipeline mechanical protections should be designed based on bathymetry and 
geotechnical survey data. Understanding the soil mechanical properties is needed to select and 
design the method of pipelines mechanical protections. Soil mechanical properties depend 
largely upon the soil components and their fractions. There are soft soils or fine grained 
components consist mainly of silt, soil clay, and organic matter. The hard soils or coarse-grained 
components, like boulder, cobble, gravel, and sand. Soil clay is difficult to compact when it is 
wet, but compacted clay is resistant to erosion. Organic matters tend to increase the 
compressibility of the soil and reduce the soil stability [33].  
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Data of existing condition on seafloor depth, buried depth, and soil types on subsea pipeline 
location are presented as shown in Appendix B.  
7.4 Mitigation Measures Categories 
In mitigation measures, all reasonably practicable steps must be taken to eliminate or reduce 
each risk. The mitigation measures can be categorized according to a control hierarchy. The 
control hierarchy is based on the concept that elimination or prevention of hazards (by 
controlling or mitigating risk) is fundamentally better than living with risk, therefore the risk 
mitigation is an important element of safety management. A typical control hierarchy is as 
follows[50]: 
1. Elimination – This method implements the mitigation measures by eliminate hazards 
altogether, e.g.  relocating hazardous obstacles to safe area or removing hazardous 
obstacles  
2. Substitution – This method implements the mitigation measures by usage a less 
hazardous material as substitution the high hazardous material. 
3. Engineering controls – This method implements the mitigation measures by using 
mechanical controls that is built in process of design, e.g. using high integrity equipment 
designed to reduce the likelihood of failure due to mechanical or process hazards. 
4. Segregation/separation – This method implements the mitigation measures by 
separating hazardous obstacles from people, assets, and the environment; e.g. increasing 
the separation distance between a hazardous obstacles and the pipeline by establishing the 
exclusion zone around the pipeline.  
5. Reduction in exposure – This method implements the mitigation measures by reducing 
the time during which exposure to the hazard may occur, e.g. minimizing the duration of 
construction during unfavorable sea conditions, reducing time spent in environmentally 
sensitive areas, etc. 
6. Management in operation – This method implements the mitigation measures by usage 
good systems or management of work (i.e. procedures, instructions, control of work, 
supervision etc.) to control hazards by ensuring the operation is carried out safely by the 
personnel involved 
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7. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) – This method implements the mitigation 
measures by protecting the worker from the hazard using PPE, e.g. gloves, hard hat, 
safety boots, fire retardant overalls, safety glasses etc. 
7.5 Mitigation Measures of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
The some mitigation measures of the subsea pipeline on the operation phase in the Madura 
strait are proposed based on mitigation measures hierarchy as following: 
7.5.1 Elimination Method: Relocation of the Subsea Pipeline Route 
The mitigation using elimination of hazardous obstacle can be carried out by relocating the 
subsea pipeline from hazardous location to new alternative location where the accident frequency 
is reduced significantly. However this option will affect significant high cost.  
In designing a pipeline offshore route, a routing selection process must perform a survey of 
seafloor bathymetry, environmental characteristics, and soil properties. For designing a pipeline 
land route, a routing selection process must consider land use, terrain, infrastructure, local 
permits and regulations, archeology, and environment. Each terrain will have its own issues. It is 
entirely conceivable to complete and approve the final route in the project planning phase. 
Moreover, each alternative route can be performed advantages and disadvantages analysis or 
feasibility analysis. 
In this research, the selected pipeline route should provide an acceptable way which views 
the new pipeline route as a balance among protecting the subsea pipeline, securing the ships 
passing in the Madura Strait, and ensuring gas supply as energy source in East Java regional. 
Shortest route from the gas production platform in the Madura Block to the Onshore Receiving 
Facilities (OPF) in the Gresik region is the main target in this pipeline relocation. However not 
all shortest pipeline route is feasible to be constructed due to several factors such as subsea 
terrain, ship traffic condition, existing other offshore installations, marine or ecologically 
sensitive area, etc. The above mentioned factors are examples of reasons that influence the 
decision in planning the new routes of the subsea pipeline. 
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The new route of the pipeline is proposed with changing the existing pipeline route in the 
fairway to be relocated in the land of the Madura Island, as shown in Figure 7-1. This proposed 
route can reduce significantly the risk level of subsea pipeline due to threats from ship traffic in 
the Madura Strait. 
 
Figure 7-1 Relocation of the Subsea Pipeline Route 
7.5.2 Engineering Controls 
The engineering controls on subsea pipeline are to prevent a loss of pipeline integrity and a 
pipeline damage resulting from an external interference. This method is performed by 
constructing a physical protection to absorb impact energy from the external interferences on the 
subsea pipeline.  
In the case of the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait, the physical protective measures 
purpose to protect the subsea pipeline from threat of dragged anchor, based on results of risk 
analysis as presented in Chapter 6, section 6.4. The two physical protection methods, burial and 
rock cover methods, are proposed to provide a reasonable protection on the subsea pipeline 
based on the guidelines for anchor hazards on pipeline [13]  
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Furthermore, the selection of physical protection will depend on comprehensive analysis on 
the detailed design including protective capacity, regulation, and economical analysis, ect. The 
detailed analysis is not covered in this research because it needs more data to perform it. Each 
method of physical protective has its own issues and difficulties in application.  
The two physical protection methods that can be applied on the subsea pipeline in the 
Madura Strait are proposed as following:  
1. Burial and gravel backfill 
2. Rock cover 
7.5.2.1. Burial and Gravel Backfill 
Burial and gravel backfill method is addressed to provide protection on the subsea pipeline 
from external force caused by dragged anchor and dropped objects. Moreover this method also 
reduces the vortex force on the pipeline thereby adding the on-bottom stability of the subsea 
pipeline.  
The burial method is suitable to be applied on the subsea pipeline that is placed on soft clay 
type because of easily implementation in field. The optimum depth of burial is crucial issue 
because it is correlated with protective capacity, installation technology used, and cost required. 
The possibility of anchor penetration should be estimated based on the anchor data. The 
possibility of the waterway dredged to remove sediment also needs to be considered. The 
analysis of backfill should take account of the uncertainties inherent in its construction phase. 
For the pipeline location near landfall, shipping lanes or anchorage areas, it should be considered 
to be increased the burial depth [13]. 
Based on soil type analysis along the subsea pipeline route in the Madura Strait, the location 
in KP35-KP50 has a soft soil type, see Figure B-1 in Appendix B. Therefore, this location is 
appropriate to apply the burial method. The gravel backfill is selected to be applied in the 
Madura Strait because the gravel material has good performance and low cost.  
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The requirements of burial depth for subsea pipeline burial in the Madura Strait are 
calculated based on following steps: 
1. Estimation of Dead Weight Tonnage for ship in the Madura Strait 
2. Estimation of burial depth for subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
The description for steps 1 and 2 above are presented as following: 
1). Estimation of Dead Weight Tonnage for ship in the Madura Strait 
The knowledge of Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT) for the largest ship category in the Madura 
Strait is needed to determine the index scales of Burial Protection Index (BPI) which in this 
research, the BPI method is used to determine burial depth. The ship data that pass in the Madura 
Strait are taken from the AIS receiver in 2008 to 2011. The ship data including the ship principle 
dimensions are gathered from Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia data and Tanjung Perak Port Authority 
data. The DWT data and ship dimension passing through the Madura Strait has been presented in 
the section 2.3. 
2). Estimation of burial depth for subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
a) Analysis of Burial Protection Index. 
To determine a burial depth to protect a subsea pipeline, Mole et al. [51] have proposed a 
concept of a Burial Protection Index (BPI). This method is a simplistic concept but it has been 
applied in practice. The BPI is scaled value in which a value of burial depth is approached based 
on soil types of seabed and an anchor weight that is expressed in DWT of ships. In this method, 
the soil types includes fine sand (hard soil type), firm clay and coarse sand (soft soils type), and 
very soft clay (very soft soil type). These burial depths recognize that different seabed soils react 
differently to the penetration of anchors [52]. Selection of higher BPI values for subsea pipeline 
protection is suitable to apply in higher risk areas such as near busy port. The detail chart of BPI 
which is recommended to estimate burial depth of subsea pipeline is presented as shown in 
Figure 7-2. 
 98 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2 The BPI Chart to Determine Burial Depth of Subsea Pipeline 
 
The soil strength properties can be identified become 3 groups[52] [53]: 
a) Hard soils (rock, stiff clay, find sand) (>72kPa). 
b) Soft soils (coarse sand, soft clay, firm clay, gravel) (18-72kPa). 
c) Very soft soils (mud, silt, very soft clay) (2-18kPa). 
 
In Figure 7-2, the BPI has been recognized that stronger seabed soils provide greater 
protection than a softer soil for a subsea pipeline buried to a similar depth. The index scale of 1 
can be used to anticipate from trawling and fishing gear with an appropriate factor of safety. The 
index scale of 2 and 3 in sequence are applied to protect the subsea pipeline from dragged anchor 
for small merchant ships and large ships. The detail of the index scales of BPI are presented as 
following: 
BPI = 1  This index scale is considered suitable for a normal fishing gear and anchoring of 
ships where water depths greater than 50 to 100 m or where shipping and anchoring is 
prohibited. This equates to 1 m depth of burial in course sand. 
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BPI=2  Depth of burial will give protection from vessels with anchors up to approximately 2 
tonnes. This index scale is suitable for normal fishing activity and small merchant 
ships but would not be adequate for larger ships, up to 10.000 ton DWT (eg. Tankers, 
Large Container Ships) 
BPI = 3  Depth of burial sufficient to protect from anchors of all but the largest ships, over 
10.000 ton DWT and up to 100.000 ton DWT. This index scale is suitable for 
anchorages in an entrance of harbors where ships have been known to often 
accidentally deploy an anchor, and heavily trafficked shipping channels with 
considering the ship anchor sizes. 
b) Estimation of burial depth  
The proposed burial depth for subsea pipeline protection in the Madura Strait is determined 
by considering some parameters such as soil properties and the largest anchors weight. The 
existing conditions of burial depth of subsea pipeline protection in the Madura Strait are 
presented as shown in Table B-1 and Figure B-1 in Appendix B[54].  
The results of subsea pipeline burial analysis in the Madura Strait using BPI method are 
presented as following: 
1. The soil for backfill uses gravel because it provides a good enough protective layer to 
absorb external forces and to prevent upheaval buckling on the subsea pipeline. 
2. The burial method is applied effectively on soft soil type in area of KP35-KP50. For the 
very soft soil type such as sediment soil, it is not calculated in determining the burial 
depth. 
3.  The proposed burial depth for subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait is determined using 
some parameters such as: seabed soil type (soft soils: coarse sand), the largest ships 
passing in the Madura Strait (up to 30.000 DWT), index scales of BPI is 3. 
4. Based on the burial analysis using BPI (index scale 3), the subsea pipeline in the Madura 
Strait can be buried with depth at least of 3.60 m into soft soils and backfill using gravel. 
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This depth includes a 20% of safety factor because the burial depth is not always 
achieved in the field for operational reasons. 
For subsea pipeline location in KP50-KP63, the soil types consist of very soft soil (ignored in 
the burial depth calculation) and hard soil or limestone, as shown in Table B-1 and Figure B-1 in 
Appendix B [54]. The hard soil type requires high technology and very expensive cost to apply 
the burial method. For this reason, this location is proposed to use rock cover method to protect 
the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. The analysis of rock cover for subsea pipeline location 
in KP50-KP63 is carried out in section 7.5.2.2. 
Figure 7-3 and Figure 7-4 show proposed burial depth for mitigation of subsea pipeline in the 
Madura Strait. Figure 7-3 can be seen differences of burial depth between the existing burial 
depths with the proposed burial depth for subsea pipeline location in KP36-KP50.  
 
Figure 7-3 Mitigation Plan: Buried Deeper and Rock Cover of Subsea Pipeline  
in the Madura Strait 
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Figure 7-4 Design of Buried Pipeline with Gravel Backfill 
7.5.2.2. Covering the Subsea Pipeline Using Rock  
The subsea pipeline that placed on hard soil or limestone can be protected against dragged 
anchor and dropped objects by using rock cover method. The rock cover has excellent resistance 
to absorb the impact loads and provides stability to the pipeline. Besides, this method can 
prevent upheaval buckling caused the lateral movement of the pipeline. Various installation 
techniques have been developed using a specific ship. The type of material required and the 
amount of material required are determined based on availability of material in the site location. 
The material used to form the protective layer must provide sufficient resistance to withstand the 
flow induced forces such as shear stress and vortex. The stability of the layer is analyzed based 
upon current flow around the pipeline [55]. 
a) Location of rock cover in the Madura Strait 
Based on soil type analysis along subsea pipeline route in the Madura Strait, the location in 
KP50-KP63 has hard soils type or limestone type, see Table B-1 and Figure B-1 in Appendix B. 
The usage of rock cover to protect the subsea pipeline in KP50-KP63 is as an alternative to 
pursue good performance and cost effectiveness because of low material cost and installation 
cost. 
b) Design of rock cover for the subsea pipeline 
The thickness of rock cover can be approached using BPI method. The usage of  BPI method 
has been introduced in previous section and it has been applied in practice. The results of rock 
1 
2 3.60 m 
Gravel backfill 
Subsea pipeline 
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cover design analysis for subsea pipeline protection in the Madura Strait are presented as 
following: 
1. The rock cover provides a good enough protective layer to absorb external forces and to 
prevent upheaval buckling on the subsea pipeline. 
2. The rock cover method is applied for KP50-KP63 that has soil type of hard soil or 
limestone.  The rock cover is designed to protect the subsea pipeline from dragged anchor 
of the largest ships, with DWT = 30.000 ton, passing in the Madura Strait. The index 
scale of BPI is 3. 
3. Based on analysis using BPI method with index scale of 3, soil cover type by rock (hard 
soil), and usage BPI graphic in Figure 7-2, it can be determined that the thickness of rock 
cover is at least of 1.8 m. This depth includes a 20% of safety factor for operational 
reasons. 
 
Figure 7-3 in section 7.5.2.1 shows the proposed pipeline burial in KP36-KP50 and also 
proposed rock cover in KP50-KP63 to protect the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. Figure 
7-5 show proposed alternative rock cover design. 
 
 
Figure 7-5 Design of Rock Cover on Subsea Pipeline 
7.5.3 Segregation/separation 
The segregation or separation method establishes the exclusion zones around subsea 
pipelines. An exclusion zone is a safe zone around the pipeline; it prevents external operation 
interferences from ship traffic. To establish the exclusion zone, pipeline operators consult with 
port authorities to install the Aids To Navigation (ATON) that mark the exclusion zones. The 
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ATON can decrease the likelihood of ships deviating from their intended route or designated 
channel [56].  
There are some facilities of ATONs which have been installed to secure the marine traffic in 
the Madura Straits such as marker buoys, navigation lights, and navigation charts. These 
facilities are part of the marine traffic system in the Madura Strait. According to the National 
Transportation Safety Committee of Indonesia, the availability of the ATONs are now still 
lacking that is caused developing of new subsea pipeline placed in the Madura Strait[44]. 
a) Aids to Navigation (ATON) 
The ATON is recommended throughout the world by the International Association of 
Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). In general, the goal of the ATON system is to provide safe 
navigation on the waterways and on specific hazard areas. Each ATON has a purpose and helps 
in determining the ship’s location, moving it from one place to another, or keeping it out of 
danger.  
Some facilities in sea are commonly installed as aids to navigation in fairway which are part 
of the marine traffic system. To mark navigable channels, waterways, and specific hazard areas, 
the ATONs use a simple arrangement of colors, shapes, numbers, and light characteristics. These 
ATONs can be specific instruments such as lighthouses, minor and major lights, day beacons, 
range lights, sound signals, and lighted or unlighted buoys [57]. 
The ATON system is intended for use with nautical charts that are issued by the national 
hydrographic offices in many countries. Many hydrographic offices regularly (sometimes 
monthly) provide manual updates of their charts through their sales agents. The nautical charts 
are one of the most important tools used by officers in ships for planning trips and safely 
navigating waterways. The nautical charts show the general configuration of the sea bottom, 
locations and characteristics of the ATON, depths of water, land features, directional information, 
marine hazards, and other features useful to the mariner, including marked pipelines and cables. 
b) Regulation 
The marking on offshore structures like subsea pipeline should implement the 
recommendation O-139 from IALA as a minimum requirement. These recommendations are for 
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the guidance and information of stakeholders such as National Administrations, Lighthouse 
Authorities, Aviation Authorities and other competent Authorities, ATON providers, and the 
contractors and developers involved in installation [58]. 
These recommendations should be applied to all structures fixed in position temporarily or 
permanently which extend above or below the surface of the sea and which are obstructions to 
navigation.  
Responsible authorities must ensure that shipping company and other stakeholders will be 
informed of all marking, published in nautical documents and by promulgation of navigational 
warnings. 
c) Proposed Aids to Navigation for Madura Strait 
According to data from the Tanjung Perak Port Authority in 2010, 42 ATONs were installed 
on the waterways of the Madura Strait. In addition, the port authority also developed a vessel 
traffic services (VTS) system and AIS to improve the ship traffic system. However, according to 
the National Transportation Safety Committee of Indonesia, new navigation aids are still needed 
to protect the new subsea pipelines installed in the Madura Strait [44]. 
Existing ATONs are insufficient to protect new subsea pipelines in the Madura Strait. 
Improvements to ATONs and nautical charts are needed to ensure safer and smoother 
movements of ships near the exclusion zone of the subsea pipeline. 
As part of mitigation measures in this research, the proposed ATONs in Madura Strait are 
constructed approximately 95 m away from the subsea pipeline to preserve the exclusion zone 
[4]. This distance will keep the subsea pipeline safe from dragged anchors. The ship traffic 
distributions by AIS data are considered in determining the location and the number of the 
proposed ATONs that will be installed. The proposed ATONs include lighted buoys, minor 
lights, and lighted pillar buoys. The existing ATONs and the proposed ATONs are shown in 
Figures 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9. 
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Figure 7-6 Proposed ATON to be Installed near Subsea Pipeline in KP35-KP42 
 
 
Figure 7-7 Proposed ATON to be Installed near Subsea Pipeline in KP42-KP50 
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Figure 7-8 Proposed ATON to be Installed near Subsea Pipeline in KP50-KP58 
 
 
Figure 7-9 Proposed ATON to be Installed near Subsea Pipeline in KP58-KP60 
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7.5.4 Management 
7.5.4.1. Improvement of the safety management system 
Mitigation programs can also use the safety-of-operation management method for subsea 
pipelines in a port area to improve pilotage management, ship traffic management, and port 
patrols. The safety management team can increase the safety requirements and obtain feedback 
intelligence to improve the risk management system. 
The mitigation measures for subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait can be addressed through as 
following: 
1. Management Measures: Establishing and implementing operational action to prevent or 
to reduce the probability of pipeline accidents through some mitigation programs.  
2. Monitoring of Management Measures: monitoring of mitigation programs to provide 
evaluation of the overall design and effectiveness of the mitigations measures. Usages of 
VTS and AIS can be optimized to support the monitoring of management measures to 
provide ship traffic information. 
7.5.4.2. Improvement of Pilotage Management 
A port pilot is a mariner who guides ships through dangerous or congested waters, such as 
port or river mouths. Pilots are expert ship handlers who possess detailed knowledge of local 
waterways [59].  The port pilot, communications, and weather information all contribute to the 
safety of ships entering a busy waterway. Most port states protect their restricted port waters by 
requiring the presence onboard of a local port pilot. 
In a busy waterway with a subsea pipeline network, pilotage becomes extremely important to 
minimize the probability of a ship unexpectedly doing something that endangers the subsea 
pipelines. 
a) Pilotage Management 
Pilotage is mandatory for ships to pass into the waterways of the Madura Strait. Based on 
data from Tanjung Perak Port Authority in 2005 to 2010, the probability of port pilots guiding 
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ships in the Madura Strait area is 75%. The average numbers of ship calls in the Madura Strait 
are 86 ships per day. The existence of the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait makes the 
waterway narrower and, therefore, riskier.  
Therefore, pilotage management in the Madura Strait must be improved to achieve 
effectiveness and safety in operation. Pilotage licenses need to be reviewed in relation to the 
difficulty of pilotage in a specific area. The standard operating procedures of the pilotage system 
can be developed by a committee of port pilots, tug operators, VTS operators, port authorities, 
and safety and risk management teams. 
Hourly information about ship traffic distribution or the density of traffic passing through a 
busy port is important for improving the pilotage management, ship traffic management, and port 
patrols. The regular busy time for ships passing in ship lanes can be identified using ship traffic 
distribution per hour.  
The pilotage management can be improved based on analysis of hourly ship traffic 
distribution from the AIS data. Figure 7-10 shows the probability of ship traffic distribution 
every 4 h in the Madura Strait.    
 
Figure 7-10 Probability of ship traffic distribution every 4 h in the Madura Strait 
Based on Figure 7-10, the port pilot shift can be divided into three shifts: Shift 1 (20:00–
04:00), Shift 2 (04:00–12:00), and Shift 3 (12:00–20:00). The number of port pilots required for 
Shift 1 is more than twice the number required for Shifts 2 or 3. 
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b) Training and monitoring  
In restricted waters of a port area, pilotage is important to handle ships safely. In this area, 
the workload of a pilot on the bridge increases immensely because the time between error and 
consequences can be a very short interval, and specialized knowledge of ship handling in 
restricted waters and local conditions is required [60]. 
In mitigation measures for the Madura Strait, port pilots and tugboat operators need to 
improve and maintain their competency through training, and a monitoring system is needed for 
operational staff to ensure their on-going competence for tasks undertaken. Simulator training 
could be considered for this requirement. This training also introduces the risk management 
system and risk mitigation where improvements have been made in the Madura Strait area. Pilot 
monitoring systems need to be considered to evaluate pilot performance and to determine any 
required training for the pilot. 
7.5.4.3. Improvement of the Pipeline Patrol Management 
Port authority cooperating with pipeline operator must develop a pipeline patrol management 
to identify activities adjacent to the subsea pipeline including monitoring ship traffic around the 
pipeline. The pipeline patrol that is managed very well can reduce the risk of pipeline damage.  
In mitigation measures in the Madura Strait, the pipeline patrol management can provide 
some activities as following: 
1.  Pipeline patrols to identify activities adjacent to exclusion zone of the subsea pipeline 
including monitoring ship traffic around the pipeline.  
2.  Inspection of the ATON such as lighted buoys, minor light, and lighted pillar buoy to 
indicate the exclusion zone of the subsea pipeline. 
3.  The third party activity which performs work near the exclusion zone of the subsea 
pipeline and has potential to damage the pipeline must be supervised by pipeline operator 
or pipeline patrol.  
4. Monitoring of Management Measures to provide verification of the overall design and 
effectiveness of the mitigations measures. 
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7.6 Trade-off Analysis of Risk Mitigation Measures 
The trade-off analysis of each of the mitigation measures is performed in order to evaluate 
positive and negative effects that are used as consideration to make decision by government or 
port authority or pipeline owner. A cost required for each mitigation presented above will be 
dependent on a significant amount of subsea intervention and consequently, installation cost, 
material, ect. In this study, the cost analysis of mitigation is approached using qualitative 
analysis. The results of trade-off analysis for each of the mitigation measures are presented as in 
Tables 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, and 7-4. 
Table 7-1 Trade-off Analysis of Mitigation Alternative 1 
Elimination Method: Relocation of the Subsea Pipeline Route 
Potential impact Potential cost Sustainable development 
 Relocating the subsea pipeline to safe 
land area, it will result high impact to 
reduce the subsea pipeline risk caused 
by ship traffic passing over the 
pipeline. 
 Relocating the subsea pipeline to the 
land need to be assessed carefully 
associated with the pipeline risks on 
people living and working in 
proximity to the pipeline that will 
allow people and pipeline to coexist 
in a manner that does not pose 
inappropriate risk to each other.  
 Maintenance and repair of the 
pipeline are relatively easy to carry 
out. 
 This option will affect 
significant expensive cost 
of investment. 
 The maintenance and repair 
cost of pipeline are 
relatively cheaper than the 
alternatives 2, 3, and 4. 
 
 This method will contribute 
to sustainable development in 
increasing ship traffic 
capacity in Madura Strait. 
The local government or port 
authority can increase the 
ship lane depth so that large 
ships, having ship draft more 
than 10 meter, can pass 
through the Madura Strait. 
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Table 7-2 Trade-off Analysis of Mitigation Alternative 2 
Engineering Controls Method:  a) Burial of the Subsea Pipeline  
                                                      b) Covering the subsea pipeline using rock 
Potential impact Potential cost Sustainable development 
 Subsea pipeline protection using 
either burial method or rock cover has 
excellent resistance to absorb the 
impact loads, avoid dragged anchor, 
and provide stability to the pipeline. 
 Design and construction process 
either burial method or rock cover 
need to be assessed carefully 
associated with the stress on the 
pipeline structure that can reduce the 
pipeline integrity.  
 Maintenance and repair of the 
pipeline are relatively difficult to 
carry out. 
 Investment cost required 
for this option will be 
dependent on construction 
cost, material cost, ect. 
However, the investment 
cost of this option is 
cheaper than the cost for 
the alternative 1 but it is 
more expensive than the 
alternatives 3, and 4. 
 The maintenance and repair 
cost of pipeline are 
relatively more expensive 
than the alternatives 1, 3, 
and 4. 
 This method will contribute 
to sustainable development in 
enhancing marine safety in 
Madura Strait. However the 
local government or port 
authority cannot increase the 
ship lane depth in order that 
large ships, having ship draft 
more than 10 meter, can pass 
through the Madura Strait. 
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Table 7-3 Trade-off Analysis of Mitigation Alternative 3 
Segregation/Separation Method: Proposed Aids to Navigation 
Potential impact Potential cost Sustainable development 
 The aids to navigation should be 
installed to establish the exclusion 
zones around the subsea pipeline. 
These aids to navigation will decrease 
a deviation potential of ships from its 
intended route or designated channel. 
 Maintenance and repair of ATON and 
the pipeline are relatively easy to 
carry out. 
 Investment cost of this 
option is cheaper than the 
cost for the alternatives 1, 
2, and more or less the 
same as the cost for 
alternative 4. 
 The maintenance and 
repair cost of the pipeline 
and the ATON are 
relatively more expensive 
than the alternatives 1, 
cheaper than alternative 2, 
and more or less the same 
as the cost for alternative 
4. 
 
 This method will contribute 
to sustainable development 
in enhancing marine safety 
in Madura Strait. The 
improvement of ATON 
make coastal navigation 
safer and helping prevent 
loss of life and marine 
pollution that could result 
from damage subsea 
pipeline, ship collision, and 
stranded ship. 
 Port Authority is key 
responsibility in the 
operation and maintenance 
of aids to navigation to 
ensure safe navigation in the 
Madura Strait waters. 
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Table 7-4 Trade-off Analysis of Mitigation Alternative 4 
Safety-of-Operation Management Method: Improvement of Pilotage and Patrol Management 
Potential impact Potential cost Sustainable development 
 This mitigation programs improve 
the pilotage capabilities, education 
program for pilotage, port patrols 
capabilities, safety regulation, 
follow-up action of the feedback 
intelligence. 
 
 Investment cost for this 
option will be dependent 
on cost of each component 
required such as 
equipment cost, technical 
assistance cost, 
operational cost, and 
management cost, ect. 
Roughly, the investment 
and maintenance cost of 
this option is cheaper than 
the cost for the alternative 
1, 2, and more or less the 
same as the cost for 
alternative 3. 
 This mitigation will 
contribute to sustainable 
development in improving 
maritime safety culture in 
Madura Strait. 
 The safety culture reflects 
the attitudes, beliefs, 
perception and value that 
employees share in relation 
to safety[61]. 
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7.7 Discussion 
As presented above, the mitigation approach using qualitative analysis show that some 
mitigations offer substantial analysis of construction design, management program, and trade-off 
analysis that consist of potential impact analysis, potential cost analysis, sustainable development 
analysis. In this Chapter, the investment and maintenance cost are estimated roughly by using 
qualitative analysis. However, the detail costs of each mitigation options are dictated by the 
complexity of the structure, raw materials, the location where it will be built, and the methods of 
construction used.   
The selection of the particular mitigation option that is most suited to be implemented is very 
much dependant on the conditions and constraints affecting in Madura Strait. These constraints 
can be either a policy of sustainable development of the Madura strait in the future, costs, 
technical difficulty, environment difficulty, etc.  
Mitigation method using relocation of the subsea pipeline route to new location is relatively 
complex method because it needs new design in new location. This option will affect significant 
high cost and long time schedule in implementation. Besides, this option should consider the risk 
analysis in new location.  
Mitigation method using combination of several potential mitigation methods can be also 
applied in order to get many benefits from the combination method.   For instance, the 
engineering controls method (increasing depth of burial and covering using rock) is combined 
with the segregation/separation method (improvement of aids to navigation), or the management 
method (improvement of the safety management system) combined with the 
segregation/separation method (improvement of aids to navigation). 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter presents the mitigation analysis of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait due to 
dragged anchor accident as following:  
1. The mitigation analyses have been presented using qualitative analysis to evaluate all 
possibility of mitigation measures for subsea pipeline installed near busy port areas. 
The AIS data combined with a geographic information system are useful in analyzing 
the ship traffic distribution to develop the mitigation measures for the subsea pipeline 
risk reduction. The ship traffic distribution by AIS data is more realistic rather than 
making an assumption based on an engineering judgment. 
 
2. The ship traffic distribution is useful to select the new pipeline location, where the 
proposed location should avoid ship traffic as much as reasonably.  It is also useful to 
determine the location of the ATONs that will be installed near the exclusive zone of 
the subsea pipeline. The pilotage management can be improved based on analysis of 
hourly ship traffic distribution.  
 
3. The trade-off analyses for each mitigation option have been performed to evaluate the 
potential impact, the potential cost, and the sustainable development. These analyses 
provide the importance information for government or port authority or pipeline 
owner to make a comprehensive analysis. 
 
4. The selection of a mitigation method will be dependent on the conditions and 
constraints in the fields.  A cost required for each alternative mitigation will be 
dependent on a significant amount of subsea intervention and consequently, 
installation cost, material, ect. It is difficult within the confines of this study to go into 
the details costs of each mitigation method as this will be very much dependant on the 
specifics of the situation under consideration. The further in-depth study can be 
performed to provide more information before implementation of the mitigation in 
the field. 
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Chapter 8 
Additional Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Discussion 
The development of risk analysis on subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait was performed. 
Some discussions regarding this study is presented as follows: 
1. Evaluation of Ship Traffic Data in the Madura Strait 
Since 2002 new ships and later all larger sea-going ship (>300 GT) and all passenger 
ships are required Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board by regulation 19 of 
SOLAS chapter V. In this research, the AIS data in Madura Strait can be used to survey the 
ship trajectories and to analyze the ship traffic distribution. The data does not fully reflect 
the existing traffic conditions in certain location because AIS equipment is not installed in 
all ships. Therefore, it needs additional ship data to improve the ship traffic distribution in 
the Madura Strait.  
2. Development of Causation Probability Pc 
In the proposed model, how to estimate the causation probability, Pc, is one of the vital 
elements that is defined as the probability of failing to avoid a accident.  In this research, 
Pc is approached using a Bayesian network. Modeling of Bayesian network variable is 
essential in order to obtain representation of realistic situation. Therefore, it is important to 
develop the network variables of the Bayesian network and collecting more data to obtain 
the more accurate of the result.  
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Regarding to develop Bayesian network variable, the safety culture and ship 
maintenance can be added into the network variable. However, the data of the safety 
culture and ship maintenance are not available in Tanjung Perak Port Authority. As 
additional information, many local ships belonging Indonesia flag are old ships that are 
maintained below standard [44]. Implementation of SOLAS Regulation should be 
maintained continuously to ensure the ship safety. Based on ship data in the Madura Strait 
gathered using AIS combined with ship data from Biro Klasifikasi Indonesia (BKI), in 
January-June 2009, there are 30% of ships having age between 25-35 years, and 15% are 
35-40 years.  
3. Evaluation of Ship Databases 
The AIS data provides information including the ship's identity, type, ship position 
(latitude and longitude), course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related 
information. However, the AIS data does not provide full information about ships. The data 
of ship’s principal dimensions are not included in the AIS data and external resources are 
required to obtain this data. Therefore, it is important to develop ship databases for 
collecting more ship data to obtain the more accurate of the result. The ship databases 
consider not only ships from AIS data but also others ships that are not installed AIS 
equipment. 
4. Examination of Gas Dispersion Effect on Marine Traffic 
The analysis of the gas dispersion effect on marine traffic will depend on the 
momentum of gas release at the sea surface and ship traffic condition. In the case of small 
release, the gas will lose all its momentum and will disperse when it reach at the sea 
surface. At shallow water and high release rates, the natural gas will have sufficient 
momentum at the sea surface to result in a momentum jet of gas release. The effect of the 
momentum jet of gas release on marine traffic is the passenger or ship crews poisoning due 
to inhalation of toxic gas which is trapped in a compartment in ship. Another effect is that 
the gas release which is trapped in a compartment in ship can cause a fire.  This gas release 
must reach an ignition source while still at a flammable concentration. The ignition source 
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is expected only from marine traffic around gas release. It could contribute difficulty to 
estimate a fire occurred onboard because it needs specific data of passage or crew behavior 
in a room of ship.  Therefore, it is important to perform a research for analysis of fire in 
ship which is caused by the gas release which is trapped in a compartment in ship.  
5. Examination of Economic Consequence  
The economic consequence of damage to pipelines can be classified with respect to the 
delay in production and economic loss of a third party. In generally, the components of cost 
consist of a production delay, repairing cost, penalty cost from third party. The detail data 
to estimate economic consequence is difficult to be gathered in this research. This data is 
very much dependant on the specifics of the situation under consideration. Therefore, it is 
difficult within the confines of this research to estimate the economic consequence 
accurately.   
6. Examination of Mitigation Selection 
The mitigation alternatives have been presented and discussed. However, the each 
mitigation options require further in-depth research to provide more information as basis to 
decide the best solution. It is difficult in this research to go into the details costs of each 
mitigation method. The further research for each the mitigation alternative is needed in 
order to select the best mitigation measures. The further research can provide some 
importance analysis such as more elaboration of constraints, basic design analysis, 
construction analysis, and operational analysis. 
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8.2 Conclusion 
Some Conclusion regarding to risk analysis of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait have 
been performed as follows: 
1. Critical Issue of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
The subsea pipelines in the Madura Strait area are seriously threatened by the heavy 
shipping traffic through the strait. The safety of the subsea pipeline is a critical issue 
because the pipeline is likely to be exposed to damage owing to external factors from ship 
activities near subsea pipeline location. Under busy ship traffic conditions and historical 
accident data, this subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait is likely to be exposed to the risk of 
damage due to dragged anchors and sinking ships. 
2. Development of Mathematic Model and Usage of AIS Data in Risk 
Analysis 
Development of mathematic models in risk analysis is importance to be studied in order 
to provide future predictions of risk figures. The mathematic models represent the behavior 
of real phenomena or objects in mathematical terms, and they can be applied to predict risk 
of an object more realistic. In this research, the mathematic models are developed based on 
Fujii’s model to estimate the frequencies of dragged anchor and ship sinking on the subsea 
pipeline in the Madura Strait. The usage of AIS data represents the behavior of the ship 
traffic in real condition. Therefore, the usage AIS data is importance in analysis traffic 
distribution and density. 
3. Proposed Model of Dragged Anchor Frequency on Subsea Pipeline 
The proposed model to estimate the dragged anchor frequency is approached based on 
an analysis of the anchor stopping distance after a ship drops an emergency anchor and 
usage of AIS data to make the ship traffic modeling around the subsea pipeline. In this 
proposed model, the numbers of dragged anchor candidate, Na, reflect the marine 
geographic condition and intensity of marine traffic. The width of the critical subsea 
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pipeline area is estimated based on the anchor stopping distance analysis that considers 
specific characteristics such as the pipeline layouts, soils characteristic, environment load, 
ship dimensions, anchor types, and anchor weight. The causation probability in the 
proposed model is developed using Bayesian Network model. For causation factors in the 
proposed model, some factors considered in this analysis are weather conditions, 
navigational aid detection, human performance, the pilot guiding the ships, and steering 
failure. 
4. Proposed Model of Ships Sinking Frequency over Subsea Pipeline 
For estimating the frequency of ships sinking over the subsea pipeline, the proposed 
model is developed based on a scenario in which a ship sinking occurs after ship-ship 
collision over the critical subsea pipeline area. The ship-ship collision locations around the 
subsea pipeline and the ship traffic distribution models are estimated using AIS data. In this 
proposed model, ship-ship collision is occurred in the critical segment of the subsea 
pipeline area. The length of critical segment for the crossing subsea pipeline area is 
approached based on a concept proposed by Weng et al. that considers a critical situation in 
which the subject ship is expected to enter the meeting ship’s domain in the next time 
interval ∆t. The causation probability in the proposed model is developed using Bayesian 
Network model. For causation factors in this proposed model, some factors considered in 
the analysis are weather conditions, navigational aid detection, human performance, the 
pilot guiding the ships, communication with other ships, and steering failure. 
5. Consequence Analysis of Subsea Pipeline Accident  
The consequence analysis of the subsea pipeline accident in the Madura Strait is 
approached based on the gas release effect on ships passing over the subsea pipeline. The 
AIS data is used to analysis the ship traffics around the hazard area of the subsea pipeline.  
In the worst case scenario, high release rates, the result of the gas release duration is 
estimated about 1 hour. The average numbers of the ships passing in the Madura Strait 
based on the AIS data are about 3.65 ships per hour. There is possibility of the ship to be 
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stricken the gas dispersion. The flammable region or horizontal hazard range is estimated 
about 97.50 meters (based on 0.5 LFL).  
6. Risk Ranking of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
The risk ranking is determined by combining frequency ranking and consequence 
ranking and then comparing the result against acceptance criteria in a risk matrix. In this 
study, the acceptance criteria use the criteria from Rule of DNV RP-F107. The results of 
risk rankings of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait are presented as follows: 
a. Risk rankings of dragged anchor on the subsea pipeline for ship categories: 
general cargo (Small and Medium) and container (Small feeder) are determined 
fall into the Not Acceptable region for human safety consequence and economic 
consequence. The bulk carrier (Handysize and Handymax), container (feeder), 
passenger (Small and Medium), and tanker (Small, General purpose, and 
Medium) are determined fall into the ALARP region for human safety 
consequence and economic consequence. 
b. Risk rankings of ship sinking on the subsea pipeline for all ship categories are 
determined fall into the Acceptable region for human safety consequence and 
economic consequence. 
7. Mitigation of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait  
Mitigation is important element of safety management, involving the implementation of 
actions to reduce risk level or maintain risk at the Acceptance level. The mitigation analysis 
has been presented using qualitative analysis to evaluate all implementation possibility of 
mitigation measures. The AIS data combined with a geographic information system are 
useful in analyzing the ship traffic distribution and density to develop risk mitigation 
measures for the subsea pipeline that installed in ship lane.  
The result of qualitative analysis of mitigation measures shows that there are several 
mitigation methods can be applied to protect the subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait. The 
selection of a mitigation method that appropriates to a particular situation will be dependent 
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on the conditions and constraints in the fields.  A cost required for each alternative 
mitigation will be dependent on a significant amount of subsea intervention and 
consequently, installation cost, material, ect. It is difficult within the confines of this study 
to go into the details costs of each mitigation method as this will be very much dependant 
on the specifics of the situation under consideration. The trade-off analyses for each 
mitigation option have been performed to evaluate the potential impact, the potential cost, 
and the sustainable development. These analyses provide the importance information for 
government or port authority or pipeline owner to make a comprehensive analysis. 
8.3 Further Researches 
By considering some discussions and results of assessment, the some further researches that 
could be performed in order to improve the risk analysis of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
are presented as follows: 
1. Evaluation of Ship Traffic Data in the Madura Strait that considers not only ships from 
AIS data but also others ships that is not installed AIS equipment. 
2. Evaluation of causation probability Pc that elaborates the network variable of the 
Bayesian network and collecting more data. 
3. Evaluation of Ship Databases that considers the data of ship’s principal dimensions 
from all ship passing in the Madura Strait.  
4. Examination of Gas Dispersion Effect on Marine Traffic. 
5. Examination of economic consequence that considers the components of cost: 
production delay, repairing cost, penalty cost from third party. 
6. Examination of mitigation selection. The further study for each the mitigation 
alternative is needed in order to select the best mitigation. 
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Appendix A 
Data of Stockless Anchor Mass 
Based on ABS rule[32], Anchor mass of stockless type is approached by calculating 
Equipment Number (EN) and according with the anchor data in the Table 1 from the ABS 
Rule[32], Part 3, Chapter 5, and Section 1. The equation of the EN is presented as following. 
 
Equipment Number = 
2/3k mBh nA       (A.1) 
 
where : 
 k = 1.0(1.0, 1.012) 
 m = 2 (2, 0.186) 
 n = 0.1 (0.1, 0.00929) 
   = Ship Displacement 
 B = Breadth 
 H = freeboard + height of houses having a breadth greater than B/4 
A = profile area of the hull, superstructure and houses above summer load waterline. 
Superstructure or deck houses having a breadth no greater than 0.25B may be 
excluded. 
The result of the ship anchor mass based on ship category passing in the Madura Strait is 
presented as shown following: 
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Table A-1 Ship anchor mass based on ship category 
Ship type and class LWL Beam 
Stockless anchor type 
Mass per anchor 
(Based on ABS 
rule) 
Numbers 
of anchor 
 
(m) (m) (Kg) 
 
Bulk Carrier (Handysize) 163 27 4890 3 
Bulk Carrier (Handymax) max) 182 30 6900 3 
General Cargo (Small) 96 17 2460 3 
General Cargo (Medium) 142 22 3540 3 
Container (Small Feeder) 144 23 5250 3 
Container (Feeder) 192 30 7800 3 
Passenger (Small) 62 16 1740 3 
Passenger (Medium) 111 20 3300 3 
Tanker (Small) 93 16 2460 3 
Tanker (General Purpose) 154 25 5250 3 
Tanker (Medium Range) 175 27 6450 3 
Tugboat (Medium) 34 9 900 3 
Supply (Medium) 63 11 1440 3 
Navy/Patrol 88 13 1920 3 
Other (medium) 86 14 1920 3 
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Appendix B 
Bathymetry and Soils Data on Subsea Pipeline Location 
According to bathymetry survey performed by third party[54], the soil types around subsea 
pipeline in the Madura Strait from KP35 to OPF are comprised three soil types namely very soft 
soils, soft soils, and hard soils/limestone. The layouts of the subsea pipeline in the Madura strait 
are constructed in two positions on the fairway, crossing and parallel position. The subsea 
pipeline has been buried beneath seabed to protect from external interferences. The existing 
burial conditions of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait are presented as following:  
1. For pipeline location of the KP35 to KP42, the subsea pipeline is buried to 3.10 m from 
seabed (very soft soils + soft soils) and only 1.10 m buried in soft soils. In the analysis 
for dragged anchor and burial depth, the vey soft soil can be ignored in the calculation. 
Thus, only soft soil is used in the calculation dragged anchor and burial depth. 
2. For pipeline location of the KP42 to KP50, the subsea pipeline is buried to 2.10 m from 
seabed (very soft soils + soft soils) and only 0.10 m buried in soft soils.  
3. For location of the KP50 to KP56, the pipeline is exposed without burial/protection. The 
subsea pipeline is laid on hard soils/limestone.  
4. For pipeline location of the KP56 to KP63, the subsea pipeline is buried to 2.30 m only in 
soft soils.  
5. Especially for KP63-KP65.3(OPF), the pipeline is buried to 19 m using the Horizontal 
Directional Drilling method (HDD). It has high level of safety from external threats. 
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Table B-1 Existing burial conditions of Subsea Pipeline in the Madura Strait 
Location Type of soil 
Existing conditions 
of Burial depth 
Existing 
conditions of 
Burial depth 
(Very soft soils + 
Soft soils) 
(Only in Soft soils) 
KP35 to KP42 a) Layer 1: Very soft soils = 
2 m. 
b) Layer 2: Soft soils = 5 m. 
c) Layer 3: Hard soils/ 
Limestone 
3.10 meters 1.10 meters 
KP42 to KP50 a) Layer 1: Very soft soils = 
2 m. 
b) Layer 2: Soft soils = 5 m. 
c) Layer 3: Hard soils/ 
Limestone 
2.10 meters 0.10 meters 
KP50 to KP54 a) Layer 1: Hard soils/ 
Limestone. 
Exposed without burial/protection 
KP54 to KP63 a) Layer 1: Very soft soils = 
2.3 m. 
b) Layer 2: Hard soils/ 
Limestone 
2.30 meters 0  
KP63-KP65.3 
(OPF) 
a) Layer 1: Hard soils/ 
Limestone 
19 meter by the Horizontal Directional 
Drilling method (HDD). 
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Figure B-1 The soil figure of subsea pipeline in the Madura Strait 
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Appendix C 
Model variables used in Bayesian Network for Pc of Dragged 
Anchor   
Table C-1 Probability of weather condition in the Madura Strait. 
Weather condition   
Strom/heavy rain 0.070 
Good 0.930 
 
 
Table C-2 Probability of visual detection 
Visual detection     
Weather condition 
Strom/Heavy 
rain Good 
Poor visibility (<  1 nm) 0.250 0 
Good visibility (> 1 nm) 0.750 1 
 
 
Table C-3 Probability of pilot to guide. 
Pilot to guide   
No 0.400 
Yes 0.600 
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Table C-4 Probability of vigilance. 
Vigilance     
Pilot to guide No Pilot Yes Pilot 
Poor vigilance 0.250 0 
Good vigilance 0.750 1 
 
 
Table C-5 Probability of human performance 
Human performance   
Poor  1.70E-04 
Good  0.99983 
 
 
Table C-6 Probability of steering failure 
Steering failure   
Not function 3.430E-05 
Function 0.999966 
 
 
Table C-7 Probability of ship dropping its emergency anchor after losing control 
Dropping its emergency anchor   
Loss of control No Yes 
Drop anchor 0 0.028 
Not drop anchor 1 0.972 
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Appendix D 
Model variables used in Bayesian Network for Pc of Ship Sinking   
Table D-1 Probability of weather condition in the Madura Strait. 
Weather condition   
Strom/heavy rain 0.070 
Good 0.930 
 
 
Table D-2 Probability of visual detection 
Visual detection     
Weather condition 
Strom/Heavy 
rain Good 
Poor visibility (<  1 nm) 0.250 0 
Good visibility (> 1 nm) 0.750 1 
 
 
Table D-3 Probability of navigational aid detection 
Navigational aid detection   
Device 
detection 
Radar in use to 
detect 
AIS in use to 
detect 
No 0.010 0.150 
Yes 0.990 0.850 
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Table D-4 Probability of pilot to guide. 
Pilot to guide   
No 0.400 
Yes 0.600 
 
 
Table D-5 Probability of communication with other ships. 
Communication with other ships 
No 0.400 
Yes 0.600 
 
 
Table D-6 Probability of vigilance. 
Vigilance         
Pilot to guide No Yes 
Communication with other ships No Yes No Yes 
Poor vigilance 1 0 0.400 0 
Good vigilance 0 1 0.600 1 
 
 
Table D-7 Probability of human performance. 
Human performance   
Poor  1.700E-04 
Good  0.99983 
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Table D-8 Probability of steering failure. 
Steering failure   
Not function 3.430E-05 
Function 0.9999657 
 
 
